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MONETARY POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK. 
When the Federal Reserve submitted its report on 
monetary policy in mid-February, the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) had already reduced its 
target for the federal funds rate twice to counter 
emerging weakness in the economy. As the year has 
unfolded, the weakness has become more persistent 
and widespread than had seemed likely last autumn. 
The shakeout in the high-technology sector has been 
especially severe, and with overall sales and profits 
continuing to disappoint, businesses are curtailing 
purchases of other types of capital equipment as well. 
The slump in demand for capital goods has also 
worked against businesses' efforts to correct the 
inventory imbalances that emerged in the second half 
of last year and has contributed to sizable declines in 
manufacturing output this year. At the same time, 
foreign economies have slowed, limiting the demand 
for U.S. exports. 
To foster financial conditions that will support 
strengthening economic growth, the FOMC has low-
ered its target for the federal funds rate four times 
since February, bringing the cumulative decline this 
year to 2
3/4 percentage points. A number of factors 
spurred this unusually steep reduction in the federal 
funds rate. In particular, the slowdown in growth was 
rapid and substantial and carried considerable risks 
that the sluggish performance of the economy in the 
first half of this year would persist. Among other 
things, the abruptness of the slowing, by jarring 
consumer and business confidence, raised the possi-
bility of becoming increasingly self-reinforcing were 
households and businesses to postpone spending 
while reassessing their situations. In addition, other 
financial developments, including a higher foreign 
exchange value of the dollar, lower equity prices, and 
tighter lending terms and standards at banks, were 
tending to restrain aggregate demand and thus were 
offsetting some of the influence of the lower federal 
funds rate. Finally, despite some worrisome readings 
early in the year, price increases remained fairly well 
contained, and prospects for inflation have become 
less of a concern as rates of resource utilization have 
declined and energy prices have shown signs of turn-
ing down. 
The information available at midyear for the recent 
performance of both the U.S. economy and some of 
our key trading partners remains somewhat down-
beat, on balance. Moreover, with inventories still 
excessive in some sectors, orders for capital goods 
very soft, and the effects of lower stock prices and the 
weaker job market weighing on consumers, the econ-
omy may expand only slowly, if at all, for a while 
longer. Nonetheless, a number of factors are in place 
that should set the stage for stronger growth later this 
year and in 2002. In particular, interest rates have 
declined since last fall; the lower rates have helped 
businesses and households strengthen their financial 
positions and should show through to aggregate 
demand in coming quarters. The recently enacted tax 
cuts and the apparent cresting of energy prices should 
also bolster aggregate demand fairly soon. In addi-
tion, as firms at some point become more satisfied 
with their inventory holdings, the cessation of liqui-
dation will boost production and, in turn, provide a 
lift to employment and incomes; a subsequent shift to 
inventory accumulation in association with the pro-
jected strengthening in demand should provide addi-
tional impetus to production. Moreover, with no 
apparent sign of abatement in the rapid pace of 
technological innovation, the outlook for productivity 
growth over the longer run remains favorable. The 
efficiency gains made possible by these innovations 
should spur demand for the capital equipment that 
embodies the new technologies once the overall eco-
nomic situation starts to improve and should support 
consumption by leading to solid increases in real 
incomes over time. 
Even though an appreciable recovery in the growth 
of economic activity by early next year seems the 
most likely outcome, there is as yet no hard evidence 
that this improvement is in train, and the situation 
remains very uncertain. In these circumstances, the 
FOMC continues to believe that the risks are 
weighted toward conditions that may generate eco-
nomic weakness in the foreseeable future. At the 
same time, the FOMC recognizes the importance of 
sustaining the environment of low inflation and well-anchored inflation expectations that enabled the Fed-
eral Reserve to react rapidly and forcefully to the 
slowing in real GDP growth over the past several 
quarters. When, as the FOMC expects, activity begins 
to firm, the Committee will continue to ensure that 
financial conditions remain consistent with holding 
inflation in check, a key requirement for maximum 
sustainable growth. 
Selected interest rates 
[graph plotting three lines: Discount rate, Intended federal funds rate, two-year treasury, and ten-year treasury. The Y-axis spans 2/3/99 to 7/12/01.  On 2/3/99 the discount rate was about 4.5%, intended federal funds rate, two-year treasury, and ten-year treasury about 4.75%. On 6/30/99 the  intended federal funds rate was moved up to about 5.0% and at that point the two-year treasury was about 5.75%, ten-year treasury about 6.0%.  On 8/24/99 the discount rate was moved up to about 4.75%, and the intended federal funds rate was moved to about 5.25%. at that time the  two-year and ten-year treasury were still at about 5.75 and 6.0% respectively. On 11/16/99 the discount rate was moved up to about 5.0% and  the intended federal funds rate was moved to about 5.5%. At that time the two-year treasury was about 5.85%, ten-year about 6.0%. On 2/3/00  the discount rate was moved up to about 5.25% and the intended federal funds rate to about 5.75%. At that point the two-year treasury was about  6.5% and the ten year about 6.75%. On 3/21/00 the discount rate was raised to 5.5%, intended federal funds rate to 6.0% and the two-year  treasury was about 6.5%, the ten-year about 6.1%. On 5/16/00 discount rate was changed to 6.0%, intended federal funds rate to 6.5%, and the  two-year treasury at this time was about 7.0%, the ten-year about 6.5%. The rates stayed at their levels until 1/3/01, during which time the  treasuries dropped, the two-year reaching about 4.6% on 1/3/01 and the ten-year about 5.0%. On 1/3/01 the Discount rate was lowered to about  5.5%, the Intended federal funds rate to about 6.0%. On 1/31/01 the discount rate dropped to 5.0%, the intended federal funds rate to 5.5%. At  this time the two-year rate was about 4.6%, the ten-year about 5.1%. On 3/20/01 the discount rate was dropped to 4.5%, the intended federal funds  rate to about 5.0. At this time the two-year rate was about 4.2%, the ten-year about 4.8%. On 4/18/01 discount rate dropped to 4.0% and intended  federal funds rate to 4.5%. two-year treasury was about 4.5%, ten-year about 5.4%. On 5/15/01 discount rate dropped to 3.5%, intended federal  funds rate to 4.0%. two-year treasury was about 4.4%, ten-year about 5.5%. On 6/27/01 discount rate dropped to about 3.25%, intended federal  funds rate to 3.75%. Two-year treasury was about 4.0%, ten year about 5.15%. On July 12 2001 two-year treasury was about 4.05%, ten year about  5.25%.] 
NOTE. The data are daily and extend through July 12, 2001. The dates on the horizontal axis 
are those of scheduled FOMC meetings and of any intermeeting policy actions. 
Monetary Policy, Financial Markets, 
and the Economy over the First Half of 2001. 
By the time of the FOMC meeting on December 19, 
2000, it had become evident that economic growth 
had downshifted considerably, but the extent of that 
slowing was only beginning to come into focus. At 
that meeting, the FOMC concluded that the risks to 
the economy in the foreseeable future had shifted to 
being weighted mainly toward conditions that may 
generate economic weakness and that economic and 
financial developments could warrant further close 
review of the stance of policy well before the next 
scheduled meeting. Subsequent data indicated that 
holiday retail sales had come in below expectations 
and that conditions in the manufacturing sector had 
deteriorated. Corporate profit forecasts had also been 
marked down, and it seemed possible that the result-
ing decline in equity values, along with the expense 
of higher energy costs, could damp future business 
investment and household spending. In response, the 
FOMC held a telephone conference on January 3, 
2001, and decided to reduce the target federal funds 
rate 1/2 percentage point, to 6 percent, and indicated 
that the risks to the outlook remained weighted 
toward economic weakness. 
The timing and size of the cut in the target rate 
seemed to ease somewhat the concerns of financial 
market participants about the longer-term outlook for 
the economy. Equity prices generally rose in January, 
risk spreads on lower-rated corporate bonds nar-
rowed significantly, and the yield curve steepened. 
However, incoming data over the month revealed that 
the slowing in consumer and business spending late 
last year had been sizable. Furthermore, a sharp ero-
sion in survey measures of consumer confidence, a 
backup of inventories, and a steep decline in capacity 
utilization posed the risk that spending could remain 
depressed for some time. In light of these develop-
ments, the FOMC at its scheduled meeting on Janu-
ary 30 and 31 cut its target for the federal funds rate 
another 1/2 percentage point, to 5 1/2 percent, and stated 
that it continued to judge the risks to be weighted 
mainly toward economic weakness. 
The information reviewed by the FOMC at its 
meeting on March 20 suggested that economic activ-
ity continued to expand, but slowly. Although con-
sumer spending seemed to be rising moderately and 
housing had remained relatively firm, stock prices 
had declined substantially in February and early 
March, and reduced equity wealth and lower con-
sumer confidence had the potential to damp house-
hold spending going forward. Moreover, manufactur-
ing output had contracted further, as businesses 
continued to work down their excess inventories and 
cut back on capital equipment expenditures. In addi-
tion, economic softness abroad raised the likelihood 
of a weakening in U.S. exports. Core inflation had 
picked up a bit in January, but some of the increase 
reflected the pass-through of a rise in energy prices 
that was unlikely to continue, and the FOMC judged 
that the slowdown in the growth of aggregate demand would ease inflationary pressures on labor and other 
resources. Accordingly, the FOMC on March 20 low-
ered its target for the federal funds rate another 
1/2 percentage point, to 5 percent. The members also 
continued to see the risks to the outlook as remaining 
weighted mainly toward economic weakness. Fur-
thermore, the FOMC recognized that in a rapidly 
evolving economic situation, it would need to be alert 
to the possibility that a conference call would be 
desirable during the relatively long interval before 
the next scheduled meeting to discuss the possible 
need for a further policy adjustment. 
Capital markets continued to soften in late March 
and early April, in part because corporate profits and 
economic activity remained quite weak. Although 
equity prices and bond yields began to rise in mid-
April as financial market investors became more con-
fident that a cumulative downward spiral in activity 
could be avoided, reports continued to suggest flag-
ging economic performance and risks of extended 
weakness ahead. In particular, spending by consum-
ers had leveled out and their confidence had fallen 
further. The FOMC discussed economic develop-
ments in conference calls on April 11 and April 18, 
deciding on the latter occasion to reduce its target for 
the federal funds rate another 1/2 percentage point, to 
4 1/2 percent. The Committee again indicated that it 
judged the balance of risks to the outlook as weighted 
toward economic weakness. 
When the FOMC met on May 15, economic condi-
tions remained quite sluggish, especially in manufac-
turing, where production and employment had 
declined further. Although members were concerned 
that some indicators of core inflation had moved up 
in the early months of the year and that part of the 
recent backup in longer-term interest rates may have 
owed to increased inflation expectations, most saw 
underlying price increases as likely to remain damped 
as continued subpar growth relieved pressures on 
resources. In light of the prospect of continued weak-
ness in the economy and the significant risks to the 
economic expansion, the FOMC reduced its target 
for the federal funds rate an additional 1/2 percentage 
point, to 4 percent. With the softening in aggregate 
demand still of unknown persistence and dimension, 
the FOMC continued to view the risks to the outlook 
as weighted toward economic weakness. Still, the 
FOMC recognized that it had eased policy substan-
tially this year and that, in the absence of further 
sizable adverse shocks to the economy, at future 
meetings it might need to consider adopting a more 
cautious approach to further policy actions. 
Subsequent news on economic activity and cor-
porate profits failed to point to a rebound. In June, 
interest rates on longer-term Treasuries and on 
higher-quality private securities declined, some risk 
spreads widened, and stock prices fell as financial 
market participants trimmed their expectations for 
economic activity and profits. When the FOMC met 
on June 26 and 27, conditions in manufacturing 
appeared to have worsened still more. It also seemed 
likely that slower growth abroad would restrain 
demand for exports and that weakening labor markets 
would hold down growth in consumer spending. In 
light of these developments, but also taking into 
account the cumulative 250 basis points of easing 
already undertaken and the other forces likely to be 
stimulating spending in the future, the FOMC low-
ered its target for the federal funds rate 1/4 percent-
age point, to 3 3/4 percent, and continued to view the 
risks to the outlook as weighted toward economic 
weakness. 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System approved cuts in the discount rate in the first 
half of the year that matched the FOMC's cuts in 
the target federal funds rate. As a result, the discount 
rate declined from 6 percent to 3 1/4 percent over the 
period. 
Economic Projections for 2001 and 2002. 
The members of the Board of Governors and the 
Federal Reserve Bank presidents, all of whom partici-
pate in the deliberations of the FOMC, expect eco-
nomic growth to remain slow in the near term, though 
most anticipate that it will pick up later this year at 
least a little. The central tendency of the forecasts for 
the increase in real GDP over the four quarters of 
2001 spans a range of 1 1/4 percent to 2 percent, and 
the central tendency of the forecasts for real GDP 
growth in 2002 is 3 percent to 3 1/4 percent. The 
civilian unemployment rate, which averaged 4 1/2 per-
cent in the second quarter of 2001, is expected to 
move up to the area of 4 3/4 percent to 5 percent by the 
end of this year. In 2002, with the economy projected 
to expand at closer to its trend rate, the unemploy-
ment rate is expected to hold steady or perhaps to 
edge higher. With pressures in labor and product 
markets abating and with energy prices no longer 
soaring, inflation is expected to be well contained 
over the next year and a half. 
Despite the projected increase in real GDP growth, 
the uncertainty about the near-term outlook remains 
considerable. This uncertainty arises not only from 
the difficulty of assessing when businesses will feel 
that conditions are sufficiently favorable to warrant a 
pickup in capital spending but also from the difficulty of gauging where businesses stand in the inventory 
cycle. Nonetheless, all the FOMC participants fore-
see a return to solid growth by 2002. By then, the 
inventory correction should have run its course, and 
the monetary policy actions taken this year, as well as 
the recently enacted tax reductions, should be provid-
ing appreciable support to final demand. 
Economic projections for 2001 and 2002 
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Note on Change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter: Change from average for fourth quarter 
of previous year to average for fourth quarter of year indicated. 
Note on Real GDP: Chain-weighted. 
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2001: Change, fourth quarter 
to fourth quarter: 
Nominal GDP  3 1/4-5  3 1/2-4 1/4  2001: Change, fourth quarter  to fourth quarter: Real GDP
 2 
1-2  1 1/4-2  2001: Change, fourth quarter  to fourth quarter: PCE prices  2-2 3/4  2-2 1/2 
2001: Average level, 
fourth quarter: 
Civilian unemployment 
rate  4 3/4-5  4 3/4-5 
2002: Change, fourth quarter 
to fourth quarter: 
Nominal GDP  4 3/4-6  5-5 1/2  2002: Change, fourth quarter  to fourth quarter: Real GDP
 2 
3-3 1/2  3-3 1/4  2002: Change, fourth quarter  to fourth quarter: PCE prices 




rate  4 3/4-5 1/2  4 3/4-5 1/4 
In part because of lower interest rates, many firms 
have been able to shore up their balance sheets. And 
although some lower-rated firms, especially in 
telecommunications and other sectors with gloomy 
near-term prospects, may continue to find it difficult 
to obtain financing, businesses generally are fairly 
well positioned to step up their capital spending once 
the outlook for sales and profits improves. By all 
accounts, technological innovation is still proceeding 
rapidly, and these advances should eventually revive 
high-tech investment, especially with the price of 
computing power continuing to drop sharply. 
In addition, consumer spending is expected to get a 
boost from the tax cuts and from falling energy 
prices, which should help offset the effects of the 
weaker job market and the decline over the past year 
in stock market wealth. Housing activity, which has 
been buoyed in recent quarters by low mortgage 
interest rates, is likely to remain firm into 2002. 
Significant concerns remain about the foreign eco-
nomic outlook and the prospects for U.S. exports. 
Nevertheless, economic activity abroad is expected to 
benefit from a strengthening of the U.S. economy, a 
stabilization of the global high-tech sector, an easing 
of oil prices, and stimulative macroeconomic policies 
in some countries. 
The chain-type price index for personal consump-
tion expenditures rose 2 1/4 percent over the four quar-
ters of 2000, and most FOMC participants expect 
inflation to remain around that rate through next year; 
indeed, the central tendency of their forecasts for the 
increase in this price measure is 2 percent to 2 1/2 per-
cent in 2001 and 1 3/4 percent to 2 1/2 percent in 2002. 
One favorable factor in the inflation outlook is the 
behavior of energy prices. Those prices have declined 
recently after having increased rapidly in the past 
couple of years, and prospects are good that they 
could stabilize or even fall further in coming quar-
ters. In addition to their direct effects, lower energy 
prices should tend to limit increases in other prices by 
reducing input costs for a wide range of energy-
intensive goods and services and by helping damp 
inflation expectations. More broadly, the competitive 
conditions that have restricted businesses' ability to 
raise prices in recent years are likely to persist. And 
although labor costs could come under upward pres-
sure as wages tend to catch up to previous increases 
in productivity, the slackening in resource utilization 
this year is expected to contribute to reduced inflation 
pressures going forward. 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
IN 2001. 
Economic growth remained very slow in the first half 
of 2001 after having downshifted in the second half 
of 2000. Real gross domestic product rose at an 
annual rate of just 1 1/4 percent in the first quarter, 
about the same as in the fourth quarter, and appears 
to have posted at best a meager gain in the second 
quarter. Businesses have been working to correct the 
inventory imbalances that emerged in the second half 
of last year, which has led to sizable declines in 
manufacturing output, and capital spending has weak-
ened appreciably. In contrast, household spending— 
especially for motor vehicles and houses—has held 
up well. Employment increased only modestly over 
the first three months of the year and turned down in 
the spring; the unemployment rate in June stood at 
4 1/2 percent, 1/2 percentage point higher than in the 
fourth quarter of last year. 
The inflation news early this year was not very 
favorable, as energy prices continued to soar and as 
measures of core inflation—which exclude food and 
energy—registered some pickup. More recently, however, energy prices have moved lower, and the 
monthly readings on core inflation have returned to 
more moderate rates. Moreover, apart from energy, 
prices at earlier stages of processing have been quies-
cent this year. 
Change in real GDP 
[graph. Percent, annual rate. In 1995 about 1.2% and 3.3%.  In 1996 about 5% and 3.4%. In 1997 about 5.2% and 3.5%.  In 1998 about 5% and 4.6%. In 1999 about 3% and 7.2%.  In 2000 about 5.5% and 1.8%. In 2001 quarter 1 about 1.3%.] 
NOTE. Here and in the subsequent charts, except as noted, change is mea-
sured to the final quarter of the indicated period from the final quarter of the 
preceding period. 
The Household Sector. 
Growth in household spending has slowed noticeably 
from the rapid pace of the past few years. Still, it was 
fairly well maintained in the first half of 2001 despite 
the weaker tenor of income, wealth, and consumer 
confidence, and the personal saving rate declined a 
bit further. A greater number of households encoun-
tered problems servicing debt, but widespread diffi-
culties or restrictions on the availability of credit did 
not emerge. 
Change in PCE chain-type price index 
[graph. Comparing total and Excluding food and energy  in percent, annual rate.  In 1995 total about 2.1%, excluding about 2.3%.  In 1996 total about 3.4%, excluding about 1.8%.  In 1997 total about 1.6%, excluding about 1.7%.  In 1998 total about 1.3%, excluding about 1.6%.  In 1999 total about 2%, excluding about 1.7%.  In 2000 total about 2.5%, excluding about 1.7%.  In 2001 quarter 1 total about 3.2%,  excluding about 2.7%.] 
NOTE. Data are for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). 
Consumer Spending 
Real consumer spending grew at an annual rate of 
3 1/2 percent in the first quarter. Some of the increase 
reflected a rebound in purchases of light motor vehi-
cles, which were boosted by a substantial expansion 
of incentives and rose to just a tad below the record 
pace of 2000 as a whole. In addition, outlays for 
non-auto goods posted a solid gain, and spending on 
services rose modestly despite a weather-related drop 
in outlays for energy services. In the second quarter, 
however, the rise in consumer spending seems to 
have lessened as sales of light motor vehicles dropped 
a bit, on average, and purchases of other goods 
apparently did not grow as fast in real terms as they 
had in the first quarter. 
Change in real income and consumption 
[graph. Comparing disposable personal income and personal  consumption expenditures in percent, annual rate.  In 1995 disposable personal income about 0.5% and 2.9%, personal  consumption expenditures about 2.8% and 3.0%.  In 1996 disposable personal income about 2.5% and 3%, personal  consumption expenditures about 4.0% and 4.6%  In 1997 disposable personal income about 3.4% and 4.3%, personal  consumption expenditures about .3.3% and 5.1%.  In 1998 disposable personal income about 5.5% and 3.7%, personal  consumption expenditures about 5.2% and 4.8%.  In 1999 disposable personal income about 3% and 3.4%, personal  consumption expenditures about 5.9% and 5.6%.  In 2000 disposable personal income about 3% and 1.7%, personal  consumption expenditures about 5.5% and 3.6%.  In 2001 quarter 1 disposable personal income about 2.2%, personal  consumption expenditures about 3.5%.] 
The rise in real consumption so far this year has 
been considerably smaller than the outsized gains in 
the second half of the 1990s and into 2000. But the 
increase in spending still outstripped the growth in 
real disposable personal income (DPI), which has 
been restrained this year by further big increases in 
consumer energy prices and by the deterioration in 
the job market; between the fourth quarter of 2000 
and May, real DPI increased just about 2 percent at 
an annual rate, well below the average pace of the 
preceding few years. In addition, the net worth of 
households fell again in the first quarter, to a level 
8 percent below the high reached in the first quarter 
of 2000. On net, the ratio of household net worth to 
DPI has returned to about the level reached in 1997, 
significantly below the recent peak but still high by 
historical standards. In addition, consumer sentiment 
indexes, which had risen to extraordinary levels in 
the late 1990s and remained there through last fall, 
fell sharply around the turn of the year. However, 
these indexes have not deteriorated further, on net, since the winter and are still at reasonably favorable 
levels when compared with the readings for the pre-
1997 period. 
Rising household wealth almost certainly was a 
key factor behind the surge in consumer spending 
between the mid-1990s and last year, and thus helps 
to explain the sharp fall in the personal saving rate 
over that period. The saving rate has continued to fall 
this year—from -0.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 
2000 to -1.1 percent in May—even though the boost 
to spending growth from the earlier run-up in stock 
prices has likely run its course and the effects of 
lower wealth should be starting to feed through to 
spending. The apparent decline in the saving rate 
may simply reflect noisiness in the data or a slower 
response of spending to wealth than average histori-
cal experience might suggest. In addition, consumers 
probably base their spending decisions on income 
prospects over a longer time span than just a few 
quarters. Thus, to the extent that consumers do not 
expect the current sluggishness in real income growth 
to persist, the tendency to maintain spending for a 
time by dipping into savings or by borrowing may 
have offset the effect of the decline in wealth on the 
saving rate. 
Wealth and saving 
[two graphs: wealth-to-income ratio and personal saving rate from  1978 to the first quarter of 2001.]  [First graph. Wealth-to-income ratio in 1978 was about a ratio of about  4.3. Tends up to about 4.7 in 1983. Down to about 4.3 in 1984. Up to  about 4.9 in 1987. Stays at about this level until about 1995 and then  moves up hitting about 6.3 in 1999. Ends at about 5.5 in quarter one of  2001.] 
[Second graph. Personal saving rate in 1978 was about  9.5%. Up to about 12% in 1982. Down to about 8.2% in  1983, up to about 11.5% in 1984, down to about 6.2% in  1987, up to about 9% in 1992, down to about 5% in 1998,  ends at about -1% in the first quarter of 2001.] 
NOTE. The data extend through 2001:Q1. The wealth-to-income ratio is the 
ratio of household net worth to disposable personal income. 
Residential Investment. 
Housing activity remained buoyant in the first half 
of this year as lower mortgage interest rates appear 
to have offset the restraint from smaller gains in 
employment and income and from lower levels of 
wealth. In the single-family sector, starts averaged an 
annual rate of 1.28 million units over the first five 
months of the year—4 percent greater than the hefty 
pace for 2000 as a whole. Sales of new and existing 
homes strengthened noticeably around the turn of 
the year and were near record levels in March; they 
fell back in April but reversed some of that drop in 
May. Inventories of new homes for sale are excep-
tionally low; builders' backlogs are sizable; and, 
according to the Michigan survey, consumers' assess-
ments of homebuying conditions remain favorable, 
mainly because of perceptions that mortgage rates are 
low. 
Private housing starts 
[graph plotting two lines: single-family and multifamily.  Measures the annual rate from 1988 to 2001. In 1988  single starts at about 1.05 million units, multi at about  .35 million units. In 1991 single is about .7 million units,  multi about .15 million units. In 1993 single is about  1.3 million units, multi about .13 million units. In 1998  single is about 1.4 million units, multi about .35 million  units. In 2001 single ends at about 1.3 million units and  multi about .3 million units.] 
NOTE. The data extend through 2001:Q2; the data for that quarter are the 
averages for April and May. 
Likely because of the sustained strength of housing 
demand, home prices have continued to rise faster 
than overall inflation, although the various measures 
that attempt to control for shifts in the regional com-
position of sales and in the characteristics of houses 
sold provide differing signals on the magnitude of the 
price increases. Notably, over the year ending in the 
first quarter, the constant-quality price index for new 
homes rose 4 percent, while the repeat-sales price 
index for existing homes was up nearly 9 percent. 
Despite the higher prices, the share of income 
required to finance a home purchase—one measure 
of affordability—has fallen in recent quarters as mort-gage rates have dropped back after last year's bulge, 
and that share currently is about as low as it has been 
at any time in the past decade. Rates on thirty-year 
conventional fixed-rate loans now stand around 
7 1/4 percent, and ARM rates are at their lowest levels 
in a couple of years. 
In the multifamily sector, housing starts averaged 
343,000 units at an annual rate over the first five 
months of the year, matching the robust pace that has 
been evident since 1997. Moreover, conditions in the 
market for multifamily housing continue to be condu-
cive to new construction. The vacancy rate for multi-
family rental units in the first quarter held near its 
low year-earlier level, and rents and property values 
continued to rise rapidly. 
Mortgage rates 
[graph. plotting two lines: fixed rate and adjustable rate from  1999 through the first half of 2001. In January 1999 Fixed rate  was at about 6.8%, adjustable rate about 5.6%. August 1999 fixed  rate was about 7.95%, adjustable about 6.2%. November 1999  fixed rate was about7.7%, adjustable about 6.4%. In May 2000  fixed rate was about 8.5%, adjustable about 7.0%. January 2001  fixed rate was about 7.0%, adjustable about 6.55%. In June  2001 Fixed rate was about 7.2%, adjustable about 5.8%.] 
NOTE. The data, which are monthly and extend through June 2001, are 
contract rates on thirty-year mortgages from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation. 
Household Finance. 
The growth of household debt is estimated to have 
slowed somewhat in the first half of this year to a still 
fairly hefty 7 1/2 percent annual rate—about a percent-
age point below its average pace over the previous 
two years. Households have increased both their 
home mortgage debt and their consumer credit (debt 
not secured by real estate) substantially this year, 
although in both cases the growth has moderated a bit 
recently. The relatively low mortgage interest rates 
have boosted mortgage borrowing both by stimulat-
ing home purchases and by making it attractive to 
refinance existing mortgages and extract some of the 
buildup in home equity. The rapid growth in con-
sumer credit has been concentrated in credit card 
debt, perhaps reflecting households' efforts to sustain 
their consumption in the face of weaker income 
growth. 
Household debt service burden 
[graph. 1985 though 2001. In 1985 debt service burden  was about 13.35%, 1987 about 14.4%, 1992 about  12%, 1997 about 13.5%, 2001 about 14.4%.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and extend through 2001:Q1. Debt burden is an 
estimate of the ratio of debt payments to disposable income; debt payments 
consist of the estimated required payments on outstanding mortgage and con-
sumer debt. 
The household debt service burden—the ratio of 
minimum scheduled payments on mortgage and con-
sumer debt to disposable personal income—rose to 
more than 14 percent at the end of the first quarter, a 
twenty-year high, and available data suggest a similar 
reading for the second quarter. In part because of the 
elevated debt burden, some measures of household 
loan performance have deteriorated a bit in recent 
quarters. The delinquency rate on home mortgage 
loans has edged up but remains low, while the delin-
quency rate on credit card loans has risen noticeably 
and is in the middle part of its range over the past 
decade. Personal bankruptcies jumped to record lev-
els in the spring, but some of the spurt was probably 
the result of a rush to file before Congress passed 
bankruptcy reform legislation. 
Delinquency rates on household loans 
[graph plotting three lines: mortgages, auto loans at domestic auto  finance companies, and credit card accounts at banks. From 1988 to  2001. In 1988 mortgages were about 1.6% and auto loans about 2.1%.  In 1991 Mortgages were about 1.5%, auto loans about 2.5%, and  credit card about 5.3%. In 1994 mortgages were about 1.4%, auto loans  about 2.2%, and credit cards about 3.3%. In 1997 mortgages were  about 1.3%, auto loans about 3.6%, credit cards about 4.7%. In 2000  mortgages were about 1.2%, auto loans about 2.2%, credit cards about  4.3%. In 2001 mortgages were about 1.4%, auto loans about 2.2%,  credit cards about 4.8%.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and extend through 2001:Q1. Data on credit 
card delinquencies are from bank Call Reports; data on auto loan delinquencies 
are from the Big Three automakers; data on mortgage delinquencies are from 
the Mortgage Bankers Association. Lenders have tightened up somewhat in response 
to the deterioration of household financial conditions. 
In the May Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on 
Bank Lending Practices, about a fifth of the banks 
indicated that they had tightened the standards for 
approving applications for consumer loans over the 
preceding three months, and about a fourth said that 
they had tightened the terms on loans they are willing 
to make, substantial increases from the November 
survey. Of those that had tightened, most cited actual 
or anticipated increases in delinquency rates as a 
reason. 
Net percentage of large commercial banks tightening 
standards for consumer loans 
[graph plotting two lines: credit cards and other consumer loans  from 1996 to 2001. In 1996 credit cards started at about 25%,  other consumer loans about 16%. Third quarter of 1996 credit  cards was about 50%, other loans about 26%. Mid 1997 credit  cards was about 24%, other loans about 8%. Early 1999 credit  cards was about 8%, other loans about -2%. Mid 1999 credit  cards was about 15%, other loans about 6%. Mid 2000 credit  cards was about -3%, other loans about 5%. Mid 2001 credit  cards was about 20%, other loans about 19%.] 
NOTE. The data extend through May 2001 and are based on the Federal 
Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, 
which is generally conducted four times per year. Net percentage is percentage 
reporting a tightening less percentage reporting an easing. 
The Business Sector. 
The boom in capital spending that has helped fuel the 
economic expansion came to a halt late last year. 
After having risen at double-digit rates over the pre-
ceding five years, real business fixed investment flat-
tened out in the fourth quarter of 2000 and rose only 
a little in the first quarter of 2001. Demand for capital 
equipment has slackened appreciably, reflecting the 
sluggish economy, sharply lower corporate profits 
and cash flow, earlier overinvestment in some sec-
tors, and tight financing conditions facing some firms. 
In addition, inventory investment fell substantially in 
the first quarter as businesses moved to address the 
overhangs that began to develop late last year. With 
investment spending weakening, businesses have 
cut back on new borrowing. Following the drop in 
longer-term interest rates in the last few months of 
2000, credit demands have been concentrated in 
longer-term markets, though cautious investors have 
required high spreads from marginal borrowers. 
Fixed Investment. 
Real spending on equipment and software (E&S) 
began to soften in the second half of last year, and 
it posted small declines in both the fourth quarter 
of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001. Much of the 
weakness in the first quarter was in spending on 
high-tech equipment and software; such spending, 
which now accounts for about half of E&S outlays 
when measured in nominal terms, declined at an 
annual rate of about 12 percent in real terms—the 
first real quarterly drop since the 1990 recession. An 
especially sharp decrease in outlays for communica-
tions equipment reflected the excess capacity that had 
emerged as a result of the earlier surge in spending, 
the subsequent re-evaluation of profitability, and the 
accompanying financing difficulties faced by some 
firms. In addition, real spending on computers and 
peripheral equipment, which rose more than 40 per-
cent per year in the second half of the 1990s, showed 
little growth, on net, between the third quarter of 
2000 and the first quarter of 2001. The leveling in 
real computer spending reportedly reflects some 
stretching out of businesses' replacement cycles for 
personal computers as well as a reduced demand for 
servers. Outside the high-tech area, spending rose in 
the first quarter as purchases of motor vehicles 
reversed some of the decline recorded over the sec-
ond half of 2000 and as outlays for industrial equip-
ment picked up after having been flat in the fourth 
quarter. 
Real E&S spending likely dropped further in the 
second quarter. In addition to the ongoing contraction 
in outlays on high-tech equipment, the incoming data 
for orders and shipments point to a decline in invest-
ment in non-high-tech equipment, largely reflecting 
the weakness in the manufacturing sector this year. 
Change in real business fixed investment 
[graph. Comparing two data: structures and equipment and software,  annual rate.  In 1995 structures about 7% and -0.5%, equipment and software  about 10% and 8%.  In 1996 structures about 11% and 15%, equipment and software  about 13% and 10%  In 1997 structures about 2% and 12%, equipment and software  about 16% and 11%.  In 1998 structures about 11% and -1%, equipment and software  about 20% and 12%.  In 1999 structures about -5% and 2%, equipment and software  about 15% and 14%.  In 2000 structures about 13% and 12%, equipment and software  about 19% and 2%.  In 2001 quarter 1 structures about 15%, equipment and software  about -3%.] Outlays on nonresidential construction posted 
another sizable advance in early 2001 after having 
expanded nearly 13 percent in real terms in 2000, but 
the incoming monthly construction data imply a sharp 
retrenchment in the second quarter. The downturn in 
spending comes on the heels of an increase in 
vacancy rates for office and industrial space in many 
cities. Moreover, while financing generally remains 
available for projects with viable tenants, lenders are 
now showing greater caution. Not surprisingly, one 
bright spot is the energy sector, where expenditures 
for drilling and mining have been on a steep uptrend 
since early 1999 (mainly because of increased explo-
ration for natural gas) and the construction of facili-
ties for electric power generation remains very strong. 
Inventory Investment. 
A sharp reduction in the pace of inventory investment 
was a major damping influence on real GDP growth 
in the first quarter of 2001. The swing in real nonfarm 
inventory investment from an accumulation of 
$51 billion at an annual rate in the fourth quarter of 
2000 to a liquidation of $25 billion in the first quarter 
of 2001 subtracted 3 percentage points from the 
growth in real GDP in the first quarter. Nearly half of 
the negative contribution to GDP growth came from 
the motor vehicle sector, where a sizable cut in 
assemblies (added to the reduction already in place in 
the fourth quarter) brought the overall days' supply 
down to comfortable levels by the end of the first 
quarter. A rise in truck assemblies early in the second 
quarter led to some backup of inventories in that 
segment of the market, but truck stocks were back in 
an acceptable range by June; automobile assemblies 
were up only a little in the second quarter, and stocks 
remained lean. 
Change in real nonfarm business inventories 
[graph displaying billions of chained 1996 dollars,  annual rate 1995 though the first quarter of 2001.  In 1995 it was about $40 billion, 1996 about $23 billion,  1997 about $60 billion, 1998 about $80 billion, 1999  about $45 billion, 2000 about $60 billion, q1:2001 about  negative $25 billion.] 
Firms outside the motor vehicles industry also 
moved aggressively to address inventory imbalances 
in the first half of the year, and this showed through 
to manufacturing output, which, excluding motor 
vehicles, fell at an annual rate of 7 1/2 percent over this 
period. These production adjustments—along with a 
sharp reduction in the flow of imports—contributed 
to a small decline in real non-auto stocks in the first 
quarter, and book-value data for the manufacturing 
and trade sector point to a further decrease, on net, in 
April and May. As of May, stocks generally seemed 
in line with sales at retail trade establishments, but 
there were still some notable overhangs in wholesale 
trade and especially in manufacturing, where 
inventory-shipments ratios for producers of comput-
ers and electronic products, primary and fabricated 
metals, and chemicals remained very high. 
Before-tax profits of nonfinancial corporations 
as a percent of sector GDP 
[Graph from 1977 through 2001. In 1977 it starts at about 11.5%. In  1980 about 7.75%. In 1981 about 10%. In 1983 about 7.5%. In 1984  about 11.5%. In 1986 about 8.5%. In 1988 about 10.5%. 1991 about  8%. In 1997 about 13%. In 2001 about 10%.] 
NOTE. Data extend through 2001:Q1. Profits are from domestic operations 
of nonfinancial corporations, with inventory valuation and capital consumption 
adjustments, divided by gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate sector. 
Business Finance. 
The economic profits of U.S. corporations fell at a 
19 percent annual rate in the first quarter after a 
similar decline in the fourth quarter of 2000. As a 
result, the ratio of profits to GDP declined 1 percent-
age point over the two quarters, to 8.5 percent; 
the ratio of the profits of nonfinancial corp-
orations to sector output fell 2 percentage points over 
the interval, to 10 percent. Investment spending has 
declined by more than profits, however, reducing 
somewhat the still-elevated need of nonfinancial 
corporations for external funds to finance capital 
expenditures. Corporations have husbanded their 
increasingly scarce internal funds by cutting back on 
cash-financed mergers and equity repurchases. While equity retirements have therefore fallen, so has gross 
equity issuance, though by less. Inflows of venture 
equity capital, in particular, have been reduced sub-
stantially. Businesses have met their financing needs 
by borrowing heavily in the bond market while pay-
ing down both commercial and industrial (C&I) loans 
at banks and commercial paper. In total, after having 
increased 9 1/2 percent last year, the debt of nonfinan-
cial businesses rose at a 5 percent annual rate in the 
first quarter of this year and is estimated to have risen 
at about the same pace in the second quarter. 
Financing gap and net equity retirement 
at nonfarm nonfinancial corporations 
[graph plotting two lines: financing gap and net equity retirement.  From 1990 through the first quarter of 2001. They both start at  about $70 billion in 1990. In 1991 financing gap is about $30  billion, net equity retirement about negative $20 billion. In 1993  financing gap is about $70 billion and net equity retirement about  negative $20 billion. In 1994 financing gap is about $60 billion  and net equity retirement about $50 billion. In 1998 financing gap  is about $175 billion, net equity retirement about $270 billion. In  1999 financing gap is about $200 billion, net equity retirement  about $140 billion. In 2000 Financing gap is about $270 billion,  net equity retirement about $170 billion. In 2001 financing gap  is about $120 billion, net equity retirement about $30 billion.] 
NOTE. The data through 2000 are annual; the final observation is for 2001:Q1 
and is at an annual rate. The financing gap is the difference between capital 
expenditures and internally generated funds. Net equity retirement is the differ-
ence between equity retired through share repurchases, domestic cash-financed 
mergers, or foreign takeovers of U.S. firms and equity issued in public or private 
markets, including funds invested by venture capital partnerships. 
Major components of net business financing 
[bar graph displaying bank loans, bonds, and commercial paper.  For the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. In 1999 bank loans were  about $230 billion, bonds about $70 billion, commercial paper  about $40 billion. In the first half of 2000 bank loans were  about $100 billion, bonds about $160 billion, commercial paper  about $70 billion. The second half of 2000 bank loans were  about $30 billion, bonds about $160 billion, commercial paper  about $30 billion. Quarter 1 of 2001 , bank loans were about  $10 billion, Bonds about $400 billion with sum of components  about $200 billion, commercial paper about negative $200  billion. Second quarter of 2001, bank loans were about negative  $90 billion, bonds about $420 billion with sum of components  about $180 billion, commercial paper about negative  $140 billion.] 
NOTE. Seasonally adjusted annual rate for nonfarm nonfinancial corporate 
businesses. The data for 2001:Q2 are estimated. 
Spread of low-tier CP rate over high-tier CP rate 
[graph from 1997 through 2001. It starts at around 15 basis  points and jaggs up and down often throughout 1997, with a  spread of about 25 basis points. There is an up spike at the end  of 1997 to about 45 basis points. It jaggs up and down between  15 and 35 basis points the first three quarters of 1998, with  a sharp climb in the last quarter peaking at about 95 basis points,  heading sharply back down to about 25 basis points by the beginning  of 1999. 1999 jaggs between about 35 and 10 basis points, with a  sharp rise the middle of the last quarter to about 107 basis points.  Sharply down to about 25 by the beginning of 2000. It jaggs  between 35 and 15 until the end of 2000 where it rises sharply to  about 145 basis points. Sharply back down to about 25 the beginning  of 2001 but sharply back up to about 95 right after. Jaggs tending  downward bring it more slowly down to about 25 in mid 2001.] 
NOTE. The data are daily and extend through July 12, 2001. The series shown 
is the difference between the rate on A2/P2 nonfinancial commercial paper and 
the AA rate. 
The decline in C&I loans and commercial paper 
owes, in part, to less hospitable conditions in shorter-
term funding markets. The commercial paper market 
was rattled in mid-January by the defaults of two 
large California utilities. Commercial paper is issued 
only by highly rated corporations, and default is 
extremely rare. The defaults, along with some down-
grades, led investors in commercial paper to pull 
back and reevaluate the riskiness of issuers. For a 
while, issuance by all but top-rated names became 
very difficult and quality spreads widened signifi-
cantly, pushing some issuers into the shortest maturi-
ties and inducing others to exit the market entirely. 
As a consequence, the amount of commercial paper 
outstanding plummeted. In the second quarter, risk 
spreads returned to more typical levels and the runoff 
moderated. By the end of June, the amount of non-
financial commercial paper outstanding was nearly 
30 percent below its level at the end of 2000, with 
many firms still not having returned to the market. 
Net percentage of domestic banks tightening standards 
for commercial and industrial loans, by size of borrower 
[graph plotting two lines: small borrower, and large and medium  borrower from 1990 to 2001. In 1990 large and medium is about 59%  and small about 52%. They hit 0 around 1992, in 1993 large and  medium is about -20%, small about -12%. In 1996 they hit 0 again and  in 1997 are at around -8%. The end of 1998 they spike up, large and  medium to about 40%, small to about 14%. In 1999 large and medium  are about 8%, small about 2%. Beginning of 2001 large and medium  are about 60%, small about 46%, middle of 2001 large and medium  are about 50%, small about 36%.] 
NOTE. The data are based on the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, which is generally conducted four 
times per year. The data extend through May 2001. Small firms are those with 
annual sales of less than $50 million. 
Even though banks' C&I loans were boosted in 
January and February by borrowers substituting away from the commercial paper market, loans declined, 
on net, over the first half of the year, in part because 
borrowers paid down their bank loans with proceeds 
from bond issues. Many banks reported on the Fed-
eral Reserve's Bank Lending Practices surveys this 
year that they had tightened standards and terms— 
including the premiums charged on riskier loans, the 
cost of credit lines, and loan covenants—on C&I 
loans. Loan officers cited a worsened economic out-
look, industry-specific problems, and a reduced toler-
ance for risk as the reasons for having tightened. 
Despite these adjustments to banks' lending stance, 
credit appears to remain amply available for sound 
borrowers, and recent surveys of small businesses 
indicate that they have not found credit significantly 
more difficult to obtain. 
Meanwhile, the issuance of corporate bonds this 
year has proceeded at about double the pace of the 
preceding two years. With the yields on high-grade 
bonds back down to their levels in the first half of 
1999 and with futures quotes suggesting interest rates 
will be rising next year, corporations apparently 
judged it to be a relatively opportune time to issue. 
Although investors remain somewhat selective, they 
have been willing to absorb the large volume of 
issuance as they have become more confident that the 
economy would recover and a prolonged disruption 
to earnings would be avoided. The heavy pace of 
issuance has been supported, in part, by inflows into 
bond mutual funds, which may have come at the 
expense of equity funds. 
The flows are forthcoming at relatively high risk 
spreads, however. Spreads of most grades of corpo-
rate debt relative to rates on swaps have fallen a little 
this year, but spreads remain unusually high for lower 
investment-grade and speculative-grade credits. The 
elevated spreads reflect the deterioration in business 
credit quality that has occurred as the economy has 
slowed. While declines in interest rates have held 
aggregate interest expense at a relatively low percent-
age of cash flow, many individual firms are feeling 
the pinch of decreases in earnings. Over the twelve 
months ending in May, 11 percent of speculative-
grade bonds, by dollar volume, have defaulted—the 
highest percentage since 1991 and a substantial jump 
from 1998, when less than 2 percent defaulted. This 
deterioration reflects not only the unusually large 
defaults by the California utilities, but also stress in 
the telecommunications sector and elsewhere. How-
ever, some other measures of credit performance 
have shown a more moderate worsening. The ratio 
of the liabilities of failed businesses to those of all 
nonfinancial businesses and the delinquency rate on 
C&I loans at banks have risen noticeably from their 
lows in 1998, but both remain well below levels 
posted in the early 1990s. 
Net interest payments of nonfinancial corporations 
relative to cash flow 
[graph of Net interest payments of nonfinancial corporations  relative to cash flow from 1977 to 2001. In 1977 the payments  to cash flow was about 10%. It rises until about 1981 to about  19%, Down again to about 16% in 1984, a couple of spikes  tending upwards, reaching about 22.5% in 1990. Then slopes  downwards, to about 10.5% in 1996. Sloping upwards again  reaching about 13% in 2001.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and extend through 2001:Q1. 
Liabilities of failed businesses 
as a proportion of total liabilities 
[graph of Liabilities of failed businesses as a proportion of total  liabilities for nonfinancial firms from 1990 to June of 2001.  In 1990 it was about .7%. In 1991 about .95%, in 1992 about  .9%, in 1993 about .5%, in 1994 about .375%, in 1995 about .3%,  in 1996 about .35%, in 1997 about 4%, In 1998 about .2%,  in 1999 about .375%, in 2000 about .5%, in June 2001  about .55%.] 
NOTE. Annual average. Value for June 2001 is a twelve-month trailing 
average. 
SOURCE. Dun & Bradstreet. 
Commercial mortgage debt increased at about an 
8 3/4 percent annual rate in the first half of this year, 
and the issuance of commercial-mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS) maintained its robust pace of the 
past several years. While spreads of the yields on 
investment- and speculative-grade CMBS over swap 
rates have changed little this year, significant frac-
tions of banks reported on the Bank Lending Prac-
tices survey that they have tightened terms and stan-
dards on commercial real estate loans. Although the 
delinquency rates on CMBS and commercial real 
estate loans at banks edged up in the first quarter, 
they remained near record lows. Nevertheless, those 
commercial banks that reported taking a more cau-
tious approach toward commercial real estate lending stated that they are doing so, in part, because of a less 
favorable economic outlook in general and a worsen-
ing of the outlook for commercial real estate. 
The Government Sector. 
The fiscal 2001 surplus in the federal unified budget 
is likely to be smaller than the surplus in fiscal 2000 
because of the slower growth in the economy and the 
recently enacted tax legislation. Nonetheless, the 
unified surplus will remain large, and the paydown 
of the federal debt is continuing at a rapid clip. As a 
consequence, the Treasury has taken a number of 
steps to preserve liquidity in a shrinking market. The 
weaker economy is also reducing revenues at the 
state and local level, but these governments remain in 
reasonably good fiscal shape overall and are taking 
advantage of historically low interest rates to refund 
existing debt and to issue new debt. 
Federal Government. 
The fiscal 2001 surplus in the federal government's 
unified budget is likely to come in below the fiscal 
2000 surplus of $236 billion. Over the first eight 
months of the fiscal year—October to May—the uni-
fied budget recorded a surplus of $137 billion, 
$16 billion higher than during the comparable period 
last year. But over the balance of the fiscal year, 
receipts will continue to be restrained by this year's 
slow pace of economic growth and the associated 
decline in corporate profits. Receipts will also be 
reduced significantly over the next few months by the 
payout of tax rebates and the shift of some corporate 
payments into fiscal 2002, provisions included in the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2001. 
Federal saving, which is basically the unified bud-
get surplus adjusted to conform to the accounting 
practices followed in the national income and product 
accounts (NIPA), has risen dramatically since hitting 
a low of -3 1/2 percent of GDP in 1992 and stood at 
3 3/4 percent of GDP in the first quarter—a swing of 
more than 7 percentage points. Reflecting the high 
level of federal saving, national saving, which com-
prises saving by households, businesses, and govern-
ments, has been running at a higher rate since the late 
1990s than it did over most of the preceding decade, 
even as the personal saving rate has plummeted. The 
deeper pool of national saving, along with large 
inflows of foreign capital, has provided resources for 
the technology-driven boom in domestic investment 
in recent years. 
National saving as a percent of nominal GDP 
[graph plotting two lines: excluding federal saving and total, from  1984 to 2001. Excluding federal saving starts 1985 at about 22%,  with a spike up to about 23% the end of the year. Total starts at  about 19% with a spike up to about 20% the end of the year.  They both slope down until 1986, excluding federal saving reaching  about 18%, and total about 15.5%. Excluding federal saving sloped  up to about 20% in 1989, total to about 18.5%. In 1993 Excluding  federal saving is about 19%, total about 15%. In 1997 they cross,  both hitting 17.5%. In 1998 excluding federal saving is about 17%,  total about 19%. In 2001 excluding federal saving is about 13.5%,  total about 17%.] 
NOTE. The data extend through 2001:Q1. National saving comprises the 
gross saving of households, businesses, and governments. 
Federal receipts in the first eight months of the 
current fiscal year were just 4 1/2 percent higher than 
during the first eight months of fiscal 2000—a much 
smaller gain than those posted, on average, over the 
preceding several years. Much of the slowing was in 
corporate receipts, which dropped below year-earlier 
levels, reflecting the recent deterioration in profits. In 
addition, individual income tax payments rose less 
rapidly than over the preceding few years, mainly 
because of slower growth in withheld tax payments. 
This spring's nonwithheld payments of individual 
taxes, which are largely payments on the previous 
year's liability, were relatively strong. Indeed, 
although there was no appreciable "April surprise'' 
this year—that is, these payments were about in line 
with expectations—liabilities again appear to have 
risen faster than the NIPA tax base in 2000. One 
factor that has lifted liabilities relative to income in 
recent years is that rising levels of income and a 
changing distribution have shifted more taxpayers 
into higher tax brackets. Higher capital gains reali-
zations also have helped raise liabilities relative to 
the NIPA tax base over this period. (Capital gains 
are not included in the NIPA income measure, which, 
by design, includes only income from current 
production.) 
The faster growth in outlays that emerged in fiscal 
2000 has extended into fiscal 2001. Smoothing 
through some timing anomalies at the start of the 
fiscal year, nominal spending during the first eight 
months of fiscal 2001 was more than 4 percent higher 
than during the same period last year; excluding the 
sizable drop in net interest outlays that has accompa-
nied the paydown of the federal debt, the increase in 
spending so far this year was nearly 6 percent. Spend-
ing in the past couple of years has been boosted by sizable increases in discretionary appropriations as 
well as by faster growth in outlays for the major 
health programs. The especially rapid increase in 
Medicaid outlays reflects the higher cost and utiliza-
tion of medical care (including prescription drugs), 
growing enrollments, and a rise in the share of 
expenses picked up by the federal government. Out-
lays for Medicare have been lifted, in part, by the 
higher reimbursements to providers that were enacted 
last year. 
Real federal expenditures for consumption and 
gross investment, the part of government spending 
that is included in GDP, rose at a 5 percent annual 
rate in the first quarter. Over the past couple of years, 
real nondefense purchases have remained on the 
moderate uptrend that has been evident since the 
mid-1990s, while real defense purchases have started 
to rise slowly after having bottomed out in the late 
1990s. 
The Treasury has used the substantial federal bud-
get surpluses to pay down its debt further. At the end 
of June, the outstanding Treasury debt held by the 
public had fallen nearly $600 billion, or 15 percent, 
from its peak in 1997. Relative to nominal GDP, 
publicly held debt has dropped from nearly 50 per-
cent in the mid-1990s to below 33 percent in the first 
quarter, the lowest it has been since 1984. 
Declines in outstanding federal debt and the associ-
ated reductions in the sizes and frequency of auctions 
of new issues have diminished the liquidity of the 
Treasury market over the past few years. Bid-asked 
spreads are somewhat wider, quote sizes are smaller, 
and the difference between yields on seasoned versus 
most-recently issued securities has increased. In part, 
however, these developments may also reflect a more 
cautious attitude among securities dealers following 
the market turmoil in the fall of 1998. 
The Treasury has taken a number of steps to limit 
the deterioration in the liquidity of its securities. In 
recent years, it has concentrated its issuance into 
fewer securities, so that the auction sizes of the 
remaining securities are larger. Last year, in order to 
enable issuance of a larger volume of new securities, 
the Treasury began buying back less-liquid older 
securities, and it also made every second auction of 
its 5- and 10-year notes and 30-year bond a reopening 
of the previously issued security. In February, the 
Treasury put limits on the noncompetitive bids that 
foreign central banks and governmental monetary 
entities may make, so as to leave a larger and more 
predictable pool of securities available for competi-
tive bidding, helping to maintain the liquidity and 
efficiency of the market. In May, the Treasury 
announced that it would begin issuing Treasury bills 
with a four-week maturity to provide it with greater 
flexibility and cost efficiency in managing its cash 
balances, which, in part because new securities are 
now issued less frequently, have become more vola-
tile. Finally, also in May, the Treasury announced it 
would in the next few months seek public comment 
on a plan to ease the ''35 percent rule,'' which limits 
the bidding at auctions by those holding claims on 
large amounts of an issue. With reopenings increas-
ingly being used to maintain liquidity in individual 
issues, this rule was constraining many potential bid-
ders. As discussed below, the reduced issuance of 
Treasury securities has also led the Federal Reserve 
to modify its procedures for acquiring such securities 
and to study possible future steps for its portfolio. 
In early 2000, as investors focused on the possibil-
ity that Treasury securities were going to become 
increasingly scarce, they became willing to pay a 
premium for longer-dated securities, pushing down 
their yields. However, these premiums appear to 
have largely unwound later in the year as market 
participants made adjustments to the new environ-
ment. These adjustments include the substitution of 
alternative instruments for hedging and pricing, such 
as interest rate swaps, prominent high-grade cor-
porate bonds, and securities issued by government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs). To benefit from adjust-
ments by market participants, in 1998, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac initiated programs to issue securi-
ties that share some characteristics with Treasury 
securities, such as regular issuance calendars and 
large issue sizes; in the first half of this year they 
issued $88 billion of coupon securities and $502 bil-
lion of bills under these programs. The GSEs have 
also this year begun buying back older securities to 
boost the size of their new issues. Nevertheless, the 
market for Treasury securities remains considerably 
more liquid than markets for GSE and other fixed-
income securities. 
State and Local Governments. 
State and local governments saw an enormous 
improvement in their budget positions between the 
mid-1990s and last year as revenues soared and 
spending generally was held in check; accordingly, 
these governments were able both to lower taxes and 
to make substantial allocations to reserve funds. More 
recently, however, revenue growth has slowed in 
many states, and reports of fiscal strains have 
increased. Nonetheless, the sector remains in rela-
tively good fiscal shape overall, and most govern-
ments facing revenue shortfalls have managed to adopt balanced budgets for fiscal 2002 with only 
minor adjustments to taxes and spending. 
Real consumption and investment spending by 
state and local governments rose at nearly a 5 percent 
annual rate in the first quarter and apparently posted a 
sizable increase in the second quarter as well. Much 
of the strength this year has been in construction 
spending, which has rebounded sharply after a 
reported decline in 2000 that was hard to reconcile 
with the sector's ongoing infrastructure needs and the 
good financial condition of most governments. Hir-
ing also remained fairly brisk during the first half of 
the year; on average, employment rose 30,000 per 
month, about the same as the average monthly 
increase over the preceding three years. 
Although interest rates on municipal debt have 
edged up this year, they remain low by historical 
standards. State and local governments have taken 
advantage of the low interest rates to refund existing 
debt and to raise new capital. Credit quality has 
remained quite high in the municipal sector even as 
tax receipts have softened, with credit upgrades out-
pacing downgrades in the first half of this year. Most 
notable among the downgrades was that of Califor-
nia's general obligation bonds. Standard and Poor's 
lowered California' s debt two notches from AA to 
A+, citing the financial pressures from the electricity 
crisis and the likely adverse effects of the crisis on 
the state's economy. 
The External Sector 
The deficits in U.S. external balances narrowed 
sharply in the first quarter of this year, largely 
because of a smaller deficit in trade in goods and 
services. Most of the financial flows into the United 
States continued to come from private foreign 
sources. 
Trade and Current Account 
After widening continuously during the past four 
years, the deficits in U.S. external balances narrowed 
in the first quarter of 2001. The current account 
deficit in the first quarter was $438 billion at an 
annual rate, or 4.3 percent of GDP, compared with 
$465 billion in the fourth quarter of 2000. Most of the 
reduction of the current account deficit can be traced 
to changes in U.S. trade in goods and services; 
the trade deficit narrowed from an annual rate of 
$401 billion in the fourth quarter of 2000 to $380 bil-
lion in the first quarter of this year. The trade deficit 
in April continued at about the same pace. Net invest-
ment income payments were a bit less in the first 
quarter than the average for last year primarily 
because of a sizable decrease in earnings by U.S. 
affiliates of foreign firms. 
U.S. current account 
[graph of the annual rate from 1995 to the first quarter of 2001.  In 1995 it was about negative $130 billion and -$90 billion.  In 1996 it was about -$110 billion and -$130 billion.  In 1997 it was about -$120 billion and -$140 billion.  In 1998 it was about -$200 billion and -$250 billion.  In 1999 it was about -$280 billion and -$360 billion.  In 2000 it was about -$440 billion and -$470 billion.  In quarter 1 of 2001 it was about -$440 billion.] 
As U.S. economic growth slowed in the second 
half of last year and early this year, real imports of 
goods and services, which had grown very rapidly in 
the first three quarters of 2000, expanded more slowly 
in the fourth quarter and then contracted 5 percent at 
an annual rate in the first quarter. The largest declines 
were in high-tech products (computers, semiconduc-
tors, and telecommunications equipment) and auto-
motive products. In contrast, imports of petroleum 
and petroleum products increased moderately. A tem-
porary surge in the price of imported natural gas 
pushed the increase of the average price of non-oil 
imports above an annual rate of 1 percent in the first 
quarter, slightly higher than the rate of increase 
recorded in 2000. 
U.S. real exports were hit by slower growth abroad, 
the strength of the dollar, and plunging global 
demand for high-tech products. Real exports of goods 
and services, which had grown strongly in the first 
three quarters of 2000, fell 6V2 percent at an annual 
rate in the fourth quarter of last year and declined 
another 1 percent in the first quarter of this year. The 
largest declines in both quarters were in high-tech 
capital goods and automotive products (primarily in 
intra-firm trade with Canada). By market destination, 
the largest increases in U.S. goods exports during the 
first three quarters of 2000 had been to Mexico and 
countries in Asia; the recent declines were mainly in 
exports to Asia and Latin America. In contrast, goods 
exports to Western Europe increased steadily 
throughout the entire period. About 45 percent of 
U.S. goods exports in the first quarter of 2001 were capital equipment; 20 percent were industrial sup-
plies; and 5 to 10 percent each were agricultural, 
automotive, consumer, and other goods. 
After increasing through much of 2000, the spot 
price of West Texas intermediate (WTI) crude oil 
reached a peak above $37 per barrel in September, 
the highest level since the Gulf War. As world eco-
nomic growth slowed in the latter part of 2000, oil 
price declines reversed much of the year's price gain. 
In response, OPEC reduced its official production 
targets in January of this year and again in March. As 
a result, oil prices have remained relatively high in 
2001 despite weaker global economic growth and a 
substantial increase in U.S. oil inventories. Oil prices 
have also been elevated by the volatility of Iraqi oil 
exports arising from tense relations between Iraq 
and the United Nations. During the first six months of 
this year, the spot price of WTI has fluctuated, with 
only brief exceptions, between $27 and $30 per 
barrel. 
Change in real imports and exports of goods and services 
[Bar graph plotting the annual rate of imports and exports from 1995 to  the first quarter of 2001. In 1995 Imports were about 7.5% and 3%,  Exports about 6% and 14%.  In 1996 Imports were about 13% and 11%, Exports about 5% and 16%.  In 1997 Imports were about 17% and 12%, Exports about 13% and 5%.  In 1998 Imports were about 14% and 9%, Exports about -1% and 6%.  In 1999 Imports were about 10% and 14%, Exports about -1.5% and 11%.  In 2000 Imports were about 16% and 8%, Exports about 11% and 4%.  In quarter 1 of 2001 Imports were about -6% and exports about -1%.] 
NOTE. Change for the half-year indicated is measured from the preceding 
half-year, and the change for 2001:Q1 is from 2000:Q4. Imports and exports for 
each half-year are the average of the levels for component quarters. 
Financial Account. 
In the first quarter of 2001, as was the case in 2000 as 
a whole, nearly all of the net financial flows into the 
United States came from private foreign sources. 
Foreign official inflows were less than $5 billion and 
were composed primarily of the reinvestment of 
accumulated interest earnings. Reported foreign 
exchange intervention purchases of dollars were 
modest. 
Inflows arising from private foreign purchases of 
U.S. securities accelerated further in the first quarter 
and are on a pace to exceed last year's record. All of 
the pickup is attributable to larger net foreign pur-
chases of U.S. bonds, as foreign purchases of both 
corporate and agency bonds accelerated and private 
foreign sales of Treasuries paused. Foreign purchases 
of U.S. equities are only slightly below their 2000 
pace despite the apparent decline in expected returns 
to holding U.S. equities. 
The pace at which U.S. residents acquired foreign 
securities changed little between the second half 
of last year and the first quarter of this year. As 
in previous years, most of the foreign securities 
acquired were equities. 
Net financial inflows associated with direct invest-
ment slowed a good bit in the first quarter, as there 
were significantly fewer large foreign takeovers of 
U.S. firms and U.S. direct investment abroad 
remained robust. 
U.S. international securities transactions 
[two bar graphs: Private foreign purchases of U.S. securities and  Private U.S. purchases of foreign securities, each quarter from 1999  to 2001.]  [first graph. plots net foreign purchases of U.S. bonds and net foreign  purchases of U.S. equities.  In Q1 1999 bonds was about $45 billion, equities about $10 billion.  In Q2 1999 bonds was about $45 billion, equities about $35 billion.  In Q3 1999 bonds was about $80 billion, equities about $25 billion.  In Q4 1999 bonds was about $40 billion, equities about $45 billion.  In Q1 2000 bonds was about $60 billion, equities about $65 billion.  In Q2 2000 bonds was about $40 billion, equities about $35 billion.  In Q3 2000 bonds was about $60 billion, equities about $55 billion.  In Q4 2000 bonds was about $75 billion, equities about $40 billion.  In Q1 2001 bonds was about $105 billion, equities about $40 billion.] 
[second graph. plots net U.S. purchases of foreign bonds and net  U.S. purchases of foreign equities.  In Q1 1999 bonds was about $0, equities about -$2 billion.  In Q2 1999 bonds was about -$3 billion, equities about $75 billion.  In Q3 1999 bonds was about $10 billion, equities about $27 billion.  In Q4 1999 bonds was about -$2 billion, equities about $15 billion.  In Q1 2000 bonds was about $10 billion, equities about $15 billion.  In Q2 2000 bonds was about -$7 billion, equities about $65 billion.  In Q3 2000 bonds was about $12 billion, equities about $15 billion.  In Q4 2000 bonds was about $0, equities about $20 billion.  In Q1 2001 bonds was about $5 billion, equities about $20 billion.] 
SOURCE. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. 
The Labor Market. 
Labor demand weakened in the first half of 2001, 
especially in manufacturing, and the unemployment 
rate rose. Increases in hourly compensation have continued to trend up in recent quarters, while mea-
sured labor productivity has been depressed by the 
slower growth of output. 
Employment and Unemployment. 
After having risen an average of 149,000 per month 
in 2000, private payroll employment increased an 
average of only 63,000 per month in the first quarter 
of 2001, and it declined an average of 117,000 per 
month in the second quarter. The unemployment rate 
moved up over the first half of the year and in June 
stood at 4 1/2 percent, 1/2 percentage point higher than 
in the fourth quarter of last year. 
Much of the weakness in employment in the first 
half of the year was in the manufacturing sector, 
where job losses averaged 78,000 per month in the 
first quarter and 116,000 per month in the second 
quarter. Since last July, manufacturing employment 
has fallen nearly 800,000. Factory job losses were 
widespread in the first half of the year, with some of 
the biggest cutbacks at industries struggling with 
sizable inventory overhangs, including metals and 
industrial and electronic equipment. The weakness 
in manufacturing also cut into employment at help-
supply firms and at wholesale trade establishments. 
Apart from manufacturing and the closely related 
help-supply and wholesale trade industries, employ-
ment growth held up fairly well in the first quarter 
but began to slip noticeably in the second quarter. 
Some of the slowing in the second quarter reflected a 
drop in construction employment after a strong first 
quarter that likely absorbed a portion of the hiring 
that normally takes place in the spring; on average, 
construction employment rose a fairly brisk 15,000 
per month over the first half, about the same as 
in 2000. Hiring in the services industry (other than 
help-supply firms) also slowed markedly in the sec-
ond quarter. Employment in retail trade remained on 
a moderate uptrend over the first half of the year, and 
employment in finance, insurance, and real estate 
increased modestly after having been unchanged, on 
net, last year. 
Net change in private nonfarm payroll employment 
[graph of the monthly average of jobs from 1991 to the  second quarter of 2001.  In 1991 about -90000, in 1992 about 80000, in 1993  about 220000, in 1994 about 290000. In 1995 about  180000, in 1996 about 240000, in 1997 about 280000,  in 1998 and 1999 about 240000. In 2000 about 150000,  in the first quarter of 2001 about 70000, the second  quarter of 2001 about -120000.] 
Measures of labor utilization 
[graph plotting two lines: augmented unemployment rate and civilian  unemployment rate from 1970 through 2001. In 1970 augmented was  about 8%, civilian about 4%. In 1971 augmented about 11%, civilian  about 6%. In 1973 augmented was about 9%, civilian about 4.5%. In  1975 augmented about 14%, civilian about 9%. In 1979 augmented  about 10.5%, civilian about 6%. In 1982 augmented about 16%,  civilian about 11%. In 1990 augmented about 9%, civilian about 5%.  In 1992 augmented about 12%, civilian about 8%. In 2000 augmented  about 7%, civilian about 4%. In 2001 augmented about 5.5%, civilian  about 4.5%.] 
NOTE. The data extend through June 2001. The augmented unemployment 
rate is the number of unemployed plus those who are not in the labor force and 
want a job, divided by the civilian labor force plus those who are not in the labor 
force and want a job. In January 1994, a redesigned survey was introduced; data 
from that point on are not directly comparable with those of earlier periods. 
Labor Costs and Productivity. 
Through the first quarter, compensation growth 
remained quite strong—indeed, trending higher by 
some measures. These gains likely reflected the influ-
ence of earlier tight labor markets, higher consumer 
price inflation—largely due to soaring energy 
prices—and the greater real wage gains made pos-
sible by faster structural productivity growth. The 
upward pressures on labor costs could abate in com-
ing quarters if pressures in labor markets ease and 
energy prices fall back. 
Hourly compensation, as measured by the employ-
ment cost index (ECI) for private nonfarm busi-
nesses, moved up in the first quarter to a level about 
4 1/4 percent above its level of a year earlier; this 
compares with increases of about 4 1/2 percent over 
the preceding year and 3 percent over the year before 
that. The slight deceleration in the most recent 
twelve-month change in the ECI is accounted for by a 
slowdown in the growth of compensation for sales 
workers relative to the elevated rates that had pre-
vailed in early 2000; these workers' pay includes a 
substantial commission component and thus is espe-
cially sensitive to cyclical developments. Compensa-
tion per hour in the nonfarm business sector—a mea-
sure that picks up some forms of compensation that the ECI omits but that sometimes has been revised 
substantially once the data go through the annual 
revision process—shows a steady uptrend over the 
past couple of years; it rose 6 percent over the year 
ending in the first quarter after having risen 4 1/2 per-
cent over the preceding year. 
Measures of change in hourly compensation 
[graph plotting nonfarm compensation per hour and employment cost  index from 1992 to 2001.  In 1992 the compensation was about 6%, the cost index about 4.3%.  In 1994 the compensation was about 1%, cost index about 3%.  In 1996 the compensation was about 3.3%, cost index about 2.5%.  In 1998 the compensation was about 5.8%, cost index about 3.8%.  In 1999 the compensation was about 4.5%, cost index about 3%.  In 2001 the compensation was about 6%, cost index about 4.2%.] 
NOTE. The data extend through 2001:Q1. The ECI is for private industry 
excluding farm and household workers. Nonfarm compensation per hour is for 
the nonfarm business sector. 
According to the ECI, wages and salaries rose at an 
annual rate of about 4 1/2 percent in the first quarter. 
Excluding sales workers, wages rose 5 percent 
(annual rate) in the first quarter and 4 1/4 percent over 
the year ending in March; this compares with an 
increase of 3 3/4 percent over the year ending in March 
2000. Separate data on average hourly earnings of 
production or nonsupervisory workers also show a 
discernible acceleration of wages: The twelve-month 
change in this series was 4 1/4 percent in June, 1/2 per-
centage point above the reading for the preceding 
twelve months. 
Benefit costs as measured in the ECI have risen 
faster than wages over the past year, with the increase 
over the twelve months ending in March totaling 
5 percent. Much of the pressure on benefits is coming 
from health insurance, where employer payments 
have accelerated steadily since bottoming out in the 
mid-1990s and are now going up about 8 percent per 
year. The surge in spending on prescription drugs 
accounts for some of the rise in health insurance 
costs, but demand for other types of medical care is 
increasing rapidly as well. Moreover, although there 
has been some revamping of drug coverage to counter 
the pressures of soaring demand, many employers 
have been reluctant to adjust other features of the 
health benefits package in view of the need to retain 
workers in a labor market that has been very tight in 
recent years. 
Measured labor productivity in the nonfarm busi-
ness sector has been bounced around in recent quar-
ters by erratic swings in hours worked by self-
employed individuals, but on balance, it has barely 
risen since the third quarter of last year after having 
increased about 3 percent per year, on average, over 
the preceding three years. This deceleration coincides 
with a marked slowing in output growth and seems 
broadly in line with the experience of past busi-
ness cycles; these readings remain consistent with a 
noticeable acceleration in structural productivity hav-
ing occurred in the second half of the 1990s. Reflect-
ing the movements in hourly compensation and in 
actual productivity, unit labor costs in the nonfarm 
business sector jumped in the first quarter and have 
risen 3 1/2 percent over the past year. 
Change in output per hour, nonfarm businesses 
[bar graph of output per hour from 1992 to the first  quarter of 2001. In 1992 it was about 4.2%. In 1993  about -.3%. In 1994 and 1995 about 1%. In 1996 and  1997 about 2.3%. In 1998 about 3%. In 1999 about 4%.  In 2000 about 3.5%. In quarter 1 of 2001 about 2.8%.] 
NOTE. Changes are Q4 to Q4 except the change for 2001:Q1, which is from 
2000:Q1. 
Change in unit labor costs, nonfarm businesses 
[graph of change in unit labor costs from 1992 through  the first quarter of 2001. In 1992 about .6%. In 1993  about 1.7%. In 1994 about 1%. In 1995 about 1.5%.  In 1996 about .8%. In 1997 about 1.2%. In 1998 about  2.3%. In 1999 about 6%. In 2000 about 2.3%. In the  first quarter of 2001 about 3.5%.] 
NOTE. Changes are Q4 to Q4 except the change for 2001:Q1, which is from 
2000:Q1. 
Looking ahead, prospects for favorable productiv-
ity performance will hinge on a continuation of the 
rapid technological advances of recent years and on the willingness of businesses to expand and update 
their capital stocks to take advantage of the new 
efficiency-enhancing capital that is becoming avail-
able at declining cost in many cases. To be sure, the 
current weakness in business investment will likely 
damp the growth of the capital stock relative to the 
pace of the past couple of years. But once the cyclical 
weakness in the economy dissipates, continued 
advances in technology should provide impetus to 
renewed capital spending and a return to solid 
increases in productivity. 
Prices. 
Inflation moved higher in early 2001 but has mod-
erated some in recent months. After having risen 
2 1/4 percent in 2000, the chain price index for per-
sonal consumption expenditures (PCE) increased 
about 3 1/4 percent in the first quarter of 2001 as 
energy prices soared and as core consumer prices— 
which exclude food and energy—picked up. Energy 
prices continued to rise rapidly in April and May but 
eased in June and early July. In addition, core PCE 
price inflation has dropped back after the first-quarter 
spurt, and the twelve-month change in this series, 
which is a useful indicator of the underlying inflation 
trend, stood at 1 1/2 percent in May, about the same as 
the change over the preceding twelve months. The 
core consumer price index (CPI) continued to move 
up at a faster pace than the core PCE measure over 
the past year, rising 2 1/2 percent over the twelve 
months ending in May, also the same rate as over the 
preceding year. 
Change in consumer prices 
[bar graph of two data: chain-type price index for PCE and CPI.  From 1992 through the first quarter of 2001.  In 1992 PCE was about 2.9%, CPI about 3%.  In 1993 PCE was about 2.2%, CPI about 2.7%.  In 1994 and 1995 PCE was about 2.1%, CPI about 2.6%.  In 1996 PCE was about 2.3%, CPI about 3.3%.  In 1997 PCE was about 1.6%, CPI about 1.9%.  In 1998 PCE was about 1.2%, CPI about 1.6%.  In 1999 PCE was about 2.0%, CPI about 2.6%.  In 2000 PCE was about 2.3%, CPI about 3.5%.  In quarter one of 2001 PCE was about 3.2%, CPI about 4.2%.] 
NOTE. The CPI is for all urban consumers (CPI-U). 
PCE energy prices rose at an annual rate of about 
11 percent in the first quarter and, given the big 
increases in April and May, apparently posted another 
sizable advance in the second quarter. Unlike the 
surges in energy prices in 1999 and 2000, the 
increases in the first half of 2001 were not driven by 
developments in crude oil markets. Indeed, natural 
gas prices were the major factor boosting overall 
energy prices early this year as tight inventories and 
concerns about potential stock-outs pushed spot 
prices to extremely high levels; natural gas prices 
have since receded as additional supplies have come 
on line and inventories have been rebuilt. In the 
spring, gasoline prices soared in response to strong 
demand, refinery disruptions, and concerns about lean 
inventories; with refineries back on line, imports up, 
and inventories restored, gasoline prices have since 
fallen noticeably below their mid-May peaks. Elec-
tricity prices also rose substantially in the first half of 
the year, reflecting higher natural gas prices as well 
as the problems in California. Capacity problems 
in California and the hydropower shortages in the 
Northwest persist, though California's electricity con-
sumption has declined recently and wholesale prices 
have dropped. In contrast, capacity in the rest of the 
country has expanded appreciably over the past year 
and, on the whole, appears adequate to meet the 
normal seasonal rise in demand. 
Change in consumer prices excluding food and energy 
[bar graph of two data: chain-type price index for PCE and CPI.  From 1992 through the first quarter of 2001.  In 1992 PCE was about 3.3%, CPI about 3.5%.  In 1993 PCE was about 2.5%, CPI about 3.1%.  In 1994 PCE was about 2.3%, CPI about 2.7%.  In 1995 PCE was about 2.3%, CPI about 3.1%.  In 1996 PCE was about 1.9%, CPI about 2.7%.  In 1997 PCE was about 1.8%, CPI about 2.2%.  In 1998 PCE was about 1.7%, CPI about 2.5%.  In 1999 PCE was about 1.6%, CPI about 2.0%.  In 2000 PCE was about 1.6%, CPI about 2.7%.  In quarter one of 2001 PCE was about 2.7%, CPI about 3.2%.] 
NOTE. The CPI is for all urban consumers (CPI-U). 
Core PCE prices rose at a 2 1/2 percent annual rate 
in the first quarter—a hefty increase by the standards 
of recent years. But the data are volatile, and the 
first-quarter increase, no doubt, exaggerates any 
pickup. Based on monthly data for April and May, 
core PCE inflation appears to have slowed consider-
ably in the second quarter; the slowing was concen-
trated in the goods categories and seems consistent 
with reports that retailers have been cutting prices to 
spur sales in an environment of soft demand. 
Core consumer price inflation—whether measured 
by the PCE index or by the CPI—in recent quarters almost certainly has been boosted by the effects of 
higher energy prices on the costs of producing other 
goods and services. Additional pressure has come 
from the step-up in labor costs. That said, firms 
appear to have absorbed much of these cost increases 
in lower profit margins. Meanwhile, non-oil import 
prices have remained subdued, thus continuing to 
restrain input costs for many domestic industries and 
to limit the ability of firms facing foreign competition 
to raise prices for fear of losing market share. In 
addition, apart from energy, price pressures at earlier 
stages of processing have been minimal. Indeed, 
excluding food and energy, the producer price index 
(PPI) for intermediate materials has been flat over the 
past year, and the PPI for crude materials has fallen 
11 percent. Moreover, inflation expectations, on bal-
ance, seem to have remained quiescent: According to 
the Michigan survey, the median expectation for 
inflation over the upcoming year generally has been 
running about 3 percent this year, similar to the 
readings in 2000. 
In contrast to the step-up in consumer prices, prices 
for private investment goods in the NIPA were up 
only a little in the first quarter after having risen 
about 2 percent last year. In large part, this pattern 
was driven by movements in the price index for 
computers, which fell at an annual rate of nearly 
30 percent in the first quarter as demand for high-tech 
equipment plunged. This drop in computer prices 
was considerably greater than the average decrease of 
roughly 20 percent per year in the second half of the 
1990s and the unusually small 11 percent decrease in 
2000. Monthly PPI data suggest that computer prices 
were down again in the second quarter, though much 
less than in the first quarter. 
Alternative measures of price change 












Gross domestic product  1.5  1.8  2.3 
Chain-type: Gross domestic purchases  1.2  2.3  2.2 
Chain-type: Personal consumption expenditures :  1.5  2.5  2.2 
Chain-type: Personal consumption expenditures :Excluding food and energy  1.8  1.6  1.7 
Fixed-weight: 
Consumer price index:  1.7  3.3  3.4  Fixed-weight: 
Consumer price index: Excluding food and energy  2.2  2.2  2.7 
NOTE. A fixed-weight index uses quantity weights from a base year to 
aggregate prices from each distinct item category. A chain-type index is the 
geometric average of two fixed-weight indexes and allows the weights to change 
each year. The consumer price indexes are for all urban consumers. Changes are 
based on quarterly averages. 
All told, the GDP chain-type price index rose at an 
annual rate of 3 1/4 percent in the first quarter and has 
risen 2 1/4 percent over the past four quarters, an 
acceleration of 1/2 percentage point from the compa-
rable year-earlier period. The price index for gross 
domestic purchases—which is defined as the prices 
paid for consumption, investment, and government 
purchases—also accelerated in the first quarter—to 
an increase of about 2 3/4 percent; the increase in this 
measure over the past year was 2 1/4 percent, about the 
same as over the preceding year. Excluding food and 
energy, the latest four-quarter changes in both GDP 
and gross domestic purchases prices were roughly the 
same as over the preceding year. 
US. Financial Markets. 
Longer-term interest rates and equity prices have 
shown remarkably small net changes this year, given 
the considerable shifts in economic prospects and 
major changes in monetary policy. To some extent, 
the expectations of the economic and policy devel-
opments in 2001 had already become embedded in 
financial asset prices as last year came to a close; 
from the end of August through year-end, the broad-
est equity price indexes fell 15 percent and 
investment-grade bond yields declined 40 to 70 basis 
points. In addition, however, equity prices and long-
term interest rates were influenced importantly by 
growing optimism in financial markets over the sec-
ond quarter of 2001 that the economy and profits 
would rebound strongly toward the end of 2001 and 
in 2002. On net, equity prices fell 6 percent in the 
first half of this year as near-term corporate earnings 
were revised down substantially. Rates on longer-
term Treasury issues rose a little, but those on corpo-
rate bonds were about unchanged, with the narrowing 
spread reflecting greater investor confidence in the 
outlook. But risk spreads remained wide by historical 
standards for businesses whose debt was rated as 
marginally investment grade or below; many of these 
firms had been especially hard hit by the slowdown 
and the near-term oversupply of high-tech equipment 
and services, and defaults by these firms became 
more frequent. Nevertheless, for most borrowers the 
environment for long-term financing was seen to be 
quite favorable, and firms and households tended to 
tap long-term sources of credit in size to bolster their 
financial conditions and lock in more favorable costs. 
Interest Rates. 
In response to the abrupt deceleration in economic 
growth and prospects for continued weakness in the 
economy, the FOMC lowered the target federal funds 
rate 2 3/4 percentage points in six steps in the first half of this year, an unusually steep decline relative to 
many past easing cycles. Through March, the policy 
easings combined with declining equity prices and 
accumulating evidence that the slowdown in eco-
nomic growth was more pronounced than had been 
initially thought led to declines in yields on 
intermediate- and longer-term Treasury securities. 
Over the second quarter, despite the continued 
decrease in short-term rates and further indications of 
a weakening economy, yields on intermediate-term 
Treasury securities were about unchanged, while 
those on longer-term securities rose appreciably. On 
net, yields on intermediate-term Treasury securities 
fell about
 3/4 percentage point in the first half of this 
year, while those on longer-term Treasury securities 
rose about V4 percentage point. 
Rates on selected Treasury securities 
[graph plotting three lines: ten-year rate, two-year rate, and three-month  rate from January 1999 through July 2001. In January 1999 the ten and  two year rates were about 4.7%, three month about 4.5%. In March of  1999 ten year rates were about 5.4%, two about 5.25% and three month  about 4.75%. In April 1999 ten year rates were about 5.1%, two about  4.9%, and three month about 4.25%. Everything tending upwards. In  January 2000 Ten year was about 6.75%, two about 6.7%, three month  about 5.5%. In April 2000 ten year and three month was about 5.8%,  two year about 6.3%. In May 2000 two year was about 6.95%, ten  year about 6.5%, three month about 6.25%. In November 2000 three  month is about 6.5%, two year about 6.0%, ten year about 5.9%. In  March 2001 Ten year is about 4.25%, two year and three month about  4.3%. In July 2001 ten year is about 5.25%, two year about 4.1%, and  three month about 3.6%.] 
NOTE. The data are daily and extend through July 12, 2001. 
The increase in longer-term Treasury yields in the 
second quarter appears to have been the result of a 
number of factors. The main influence seems to have 
been increased investor confidence that the economy 
would soon pick up. That confidence likely arose in 
part from the aggressive easing of monetary policy 
and also in part from the improving prospects for, and 
passage of, a sizable tax cut. The tax cut and the 
growing support for certain spending initiatives 
implied stronger aggregate demand and less federal 
saving than previously anticipated. The prospect that 
the federal debt might be paid down less rapidly may 
also have reduced slightly the scarcity premiums 
investors were willing to pay for Treasury securities. 
Finally, a portion of the rise may have been the result 
of increased inflation expectations. Inflation compen-
sation as measured by the difference between nomi-
nal Treasury rates and the rates on inflation-indexed 
Treasury securities rose about V4 percentage point in 
the second quarter. Despite this increase, there is little 
evidence that inflation is expected to go up from its 
current level. At the end of last year, inflation com-
pensation had declined to levels suggesting investors 
expected inflation to fall, and the rise in inflation 
compensation in the second quarter largely reversed 
those declines. Moreover, survey measures of longer-
term inflation expectations have changed little since 
the middle of last year. 
Measures of long-term inflation expectations 
[graph plotting three lines: FRB Philadelphia survey, Michigan survey,  and TIIS inflation compensation, from January 1999 through July 2001.  FRB Philadelphia survey starts at about 2.3% in January 1999, then  throughout April is moved up to 2.5% and stays there the rest of the  graph.  In January 1999 TIIS inflation compensation starts at about 1.1%,  Michigan survey about 3.0%. In June 1999, TIIS is about 2.25%,  Michigan survey about 2.8%. In January 2000 TIIS touches the FRB  Philadelphia survey level of about 2.5%, Michigan about 3.0%. In April  2000 TIIS is down to about 2.15%, Michigan survey about 2.8%. In  May 2000 TIIS peaks at about 2.6%, Michigan survey is about 2.95%.  In January 2001 TIIS is down to about 1.45%, Michigan survey is about  3%. In May 2001 TIIS is about 2.35%, Michigan survey about 3%.  In July 2001 TIIS is about 2%, Michigan survey about 3%.] 
NOTE. The data for the Michigan survey, which are monthly and extend 
through June 2001, measure five-year to ten-year inflation expectations. The 
data for the FRB Philadelphia survey, which are quarterly and extend through 
2001:Q2, measure ten-year inflation expectations. TIIS inflation compensation 
is the rate of inflation at which the price of the ten-year Treasury inflation-
indexed security equals the value of a portfolio of zero-coupon securities that 
replicates its payments; data for this measure are weekly averages and extend 
through July 13, 2001. 
Yields on longer-maturity corporate bonds were 
about unchanged, on net, over the first half of this 
year. Yields on investment-grade bonds are near their 
lows for the past ten years, but those on speculative-
grade bonds are elevated. Spreads of corporate bond 
yields relative to swap rates narrowed a bit, although 
they still remain high. Amidst signs of deteriorating 
credit quality and a worsening outlook for corporate 
earnings, risk spreads on speculative-grade bonds 
had risen by about 2 percentage points late last year, 
reaching levels not seen since 1991. Much of this 
widening was reversed early in the year, as investors 
became more confident that corporate balance sheets 
would not deteriorate substantially, but speculative-
grade bond spreads widened again recently in 
response to negative news about second-quarter earn-
ings and declines in share prices, leaving these 
spreads at the end of the second quarter only slightly 
below where they began the year. Nonetheless, inves-
tors, while somewhat selective, appear to remain 
receptive to new issues with speculative-grade 
ratings. Corporate bond yields 
[graph plotting two lines: high yield and AA, from 1990 through 2001.  In 1990 High yield was about 17%, AA about 9%. In 1991 high yield  peaks at about 21%, AA at about 9.75%. In 1993 high yield was about  9%, AA about 6%. In 1995 high yield was about 12%, AA about 9%.  In 1998 high yield was about 9.5%, AA about 6%. In 2000 high yield  was about 12%, AA about 8%. In 2001 high yield was about 13%, AA  about 7%.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly averages and extend through June 2001. The 
AA rate is calculated from bonds in the Merrill Lynch AA index with seven to 
ten years remaining to maturity. The high-yield rate is the yield on the Merrill 
Lynch 175 high-yield index. 
Interest rates on commercial paper and C&I loans 
have fallen this year by about as much as the federal 
funds rate, although some risk spreads widened. The 
average yield spread on second-tier commercial paper 
over top-tier paper widened to about 100 basis points 
in late January, about four times its typical level, 
following defaults by a few prominent issuers. As the 
year progressed, investors became less concerned 
about the remaining commercial paper borrowers, 
and this spread has returned to a more normal level. 
According to preliminary data from the Federal 
Reserve's quarterly Survey of Terms of Business 
Lending, the spread over the target federal funds rate 
of the average interest rate on commercial bank C&I 
loans edged up between November and May and 
remains in the elevated range it shifted to in late 
1998. Judging from the widening since 1998 of the 
average spread between rates on riskier and less-risky 
loans, banks have become especially cautious about 
lending to marginal credits. 
Spread of average business loan rate 
over intended federal funds rate 
[graph of average business loan rate over intended federal funds  rate, from 1990 to 2001. In 1990 it was around 1.775 percentage  points. Went up to about 2.35 percentage points in 1991. In  1992 there was a dip to about 1.9 percentage points but was  up to about 2.2 by the end of the year. A dip to about 1.55  percentage points in the beginning of 1994 but back up to about  1.95 by the end of the year. down to about 1.525 percentage  points in 1996, then mostly tends upwards, reaching about 2.15  in 1999 and ending at about 2.1 percentage points in 2001.] 
NOTE. The data, which are based on the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms 
of Business Lending, are for loans made by domestic commercial banks. The 
survey is conducted in the middle month of each quarter; the final observation is 
for May 2001 and is preliminary. 
Equity Markets. 
After rising in January in response to the initial 
easing of monetary policy, stock prices declined in 
February and March in reaction to profit warnings 
and weak economic data, with the Wilshire 5000, the 
broadest major stock price index, ending the first 
quarter down 13 percent. Stock prices retraced some 
of those losses in the second quarter, rising 7 per-
cent, as first-quarter earnings releases came in a little 
above sharply reduced expectations and as investors 
became more confident that economic growth and 
corporate profits would soon pick up. On net, the 
Wilshire 5000 ended the half down 6 percent, the 
DJIA declined 3 percent, and the tech-heavy Nasdaq 
fell 13 percent. Earnings per share of the S&P 500 in 
the first quarter decreased 10 percent from a year 
earlier. A disproportionate share of the decline in 
S&P earnings—more than half—was attributable to a 
plunge in the technology sector, where first-quarter 
earnings were down nearly 50 percent from their 
peak in the third quarter of last year. 
Major stock price indexes 
[graph plotting three lines: Nasdaq, Wilshire 5000, and S&P 500, from  January 1999 through July 2001. They start at 100 on January 4, 1999.  The lines jagg up and down frequently, with Wilshire 5000 and S&P 500  mostly varying about 10. Those two have about the same values  throughout the graph, tending up a little until about May 2000, with  Wilshire 5000 hitting a maximum of about 130 and S&P 500 hitting  about 125. Then they tend down, hitting about 90 in May of 2001.  They end at about 100 in July 2001.  Nasdaq tends up to about 125 in October of 1999, then goes up more  sharply, hitting about 230 in February of 2000. Down to about 145 in  May 2000, Up to about 195 in July 2000. Down to about 75 in April  2001. Ends at about 100 in July 2001.] 
NOTE. The data are daily and extend through July 12, 2001. 
The decline in stock prices has left the Wilshire 
5000 down by about 20 percent, and the Nasdaq 
down by about 60 percent, from their peaks in March 
2000. Both of these indexes are near their levels at 
the end of 1998, having erased the sharp run-up in 
prices in 1999 and early 2000. But both indexes 
remain more than two and one-half times their levels at the end of 1994, when the bull market shifted into 
a higher gear. The ratio of expected one-year-ahead 
earnings to equity prices began to fall in 1995 when, 
as productivity growth picked up, investors began to 
build in expectations that increases in earnings would 
remain rapid for some time. This measure of the 
earnings-price ratio remains near the levels reached 
in 1999, suggesting that investors still anticipate 
robust long-term earnings growth, likely reflecting 
expectations for continued strong gains in 
productivity. 
S&P 500 earnings-price ratio and the real interest rate 
[graph plotting two lines: S&P 500 earnings-price ratio, and  Real interest rate, from 1990 through 2001. In the beginning of  1990, S&P was about 8.5%, interest rate about 4.25%. At the  end of 1990, S&P spiked to about 9.5%, interest rate was still  about 4.25%. In 1993 S&P was about 6.5%, interest rate about  2%. IN early 1995, S&P was about 8%, interest rate about 4.25%.  In late 1998, S&P was about 4.2%, interest rate about 2%. In 2000  S&P and interest rate were about 4%. In 2001 S&P was about  4.5%, interest rate about 2.8%.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly and extend through June 2001. The earnings-
price ratio is based on I/B/E/S consensus estimates of earnings over the coming 
year. The real rate is estimated as the difference between the ten-year Treasury 
rate and the five-year to ten-year expected inflation rate from the FRB Philadel-
phia survey. 
Despite the substantial variation in share prices 
over the first half of this year, trading has been 
orderly, and financial institutions appear to have 
encountered no difficulties that could pose broader 
systemic concerns. Market volatility and a less ebul-
lient outlook have led investors to buy a much smaller 
share of stock on margin. At the end of May, margin 
debt was 1.15 percent of total market capitalization, 
equal to its level at the beginning of 1999 and well 
below its high of 1.63 percent in March of last year. 
Federal Reserve Open Market Operations. 
As noted earlier, the Federal Reserve has responded 
to the diminished size of the auctions of Treasury 
securities by modifying its procedures for acquiring 
such securities. To help maintain supply in private 
hands adequate for liquid markets, since July of last 
year the System has limited its holdings of individual 
securities to specified percentages, ranging from 
15 percent to 35 percent, of outstanding amounts. To 
stay within these limits, the System has at times not 
rolled over all of its holdings of maturing securities, 
generally investing the difference by purchasing other 
Treasury securities on the open market. The Federal 
Reserve also has increased its holdings of longer-
term repurchase agreements (RPs), including RPs 
backed by agency securities and mortgage-backed 
securities, as a substitute for outright purchases of 
Treasury securities. In the first half of the year, 
longer-term RPs, typically with maturities of twenty-
eight days, averaged $13 billion. 
As reported in the previous Monetary Policy 
Report, the FOMC also initiated a study to evaluate 
assets to hold on its balance sheet as alternatives to 
Treasury securities. That study identified several 
options for further consideration. In the near term, the 
Federal Reserve is considering purchasing and hold-
ing Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed securities, which 
are explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the 
U.S. government, and engaging in repurchase opera-
tions against foreign sovereign debt. For possible 
implementation later, the Federal Reserve is studying 
whether to auction longer-term discount window 
credit, and it will over time take a closer look at a 
broader array of assets for repurchase and for holding 
outright, transactions that would require additional 
legal authority. 
Debt and the Monetary Aggregates. 
The growth of domestic nonfinancial debt in the first 
half of 2001 is estimated to have remained moderate, 
slowing slightly from the pace in 2000 as a reduction 
in the rate of increase in nonfederal debt more than 
offset the effects of smaller net repayments of federal 
debt. In contrast, the monetary aggregates have 
grown rapidly so far this year, in large part because 
the sharp decline in short-term market interest rates 
has reduced the opportunity cost of holding the 
deposits and other assets included in the aggregates. 
Debt and Depository Intermediation. 
The debt of the domestic nonfinancial sectors is esti-
mated to have expanded at a 4 3/4 percent annual rate 
over the first half of 2001, a touch below the 5 1/4 per-
cent growth recorded in 2000. Changes in the growth 
of nonfederal and federal debt this year have mostly 
offset each other. The growth of nonfederal debt 
moderated from 8 1/2 percent in 2000 to a still-robust 
7 1/4 percent pace in the first half of this year. House-
holds' borrowing slowed some but was still substan-
tial, buoyed by continued sizable home and durable 
goods purchases. Similarly, business borrowing mod-erated even as bond issuance surged, as a good por-
tion of the funds raised was used to pay down com-
mercial paper and bank loans. Tending to boost debt 
growth was a slowing in the decline in federal debt to 
a 6 1/4 percent rate in the first half of this year from 
6 3/4 percent last year, largely because of a decline in 
tax receipts on corporate profits. 
Growth of domestic nonfinancial debt 
[two graphs: one plotting the total, the other plotting  nonfederal and federal, from 1988 though 2001.]  [graph one: total. In 1988 the total was about 9%. In  1991 the total was about 4.5%. In 1997 it was about  5.5%. In 1998 it was about 7%. In 2001 it was about  4.5%.] 
[Graph two: federal and nonfederal.  In 1988, federal was about 8%, nonfederal about 9.5%.  In 1991 Federal was about 11%, Nonfederal about 2.5%.  In 1995 they cross at about 5%.  In 1998 Federal was about -2%, Nonfederal about 9%.  In 2000 Federal is about-7%, Nonfederal about 8%.  In 2001 Federal is about -6.5%, Nonfederal about 7%.] 
NOTE. Annual growth rates are computed from fourth-quarter averages. 
Growth in the first half of 2001 is the June average relative to the fourth-quarter 
average at an annual rate and is based on partially estimated data. Domestic 
nonfinancial debt consists of the outstanding credit market debt of governments, 
households and nonprofit organizations, nonfinancial businesses, and farms. 
The share of credit to nonfinancial sectors held at 
banks and other depository institutions edged down 
in the first half of the year. Bank credit, which 
accounts for about three-fourths of depository credit, 
increased at a 3 1/2 percent annual rate in the first half 
of the this year, well off the 9 1/2 percent growth 
registered in 2000. Banks' loans to businesses and 
households decelerated even more, in part because 
borrowers preferred to lock in the lower rates avail-
able from longer-term sources of funds such as bond 
and mortgage markets and perhaps also in part 
because banks firmed up their lending stance in reac-
tion to concerns about loan performance. Loan delin-
quency and charge-off rates have trended up in recent 
quarters, and higher loan-loss provisions have 
weighed on profits. Nevertheless, through the first 
quarter, bank profits remained in the high range 
recorded for the past several years, and virtually all 
banks—98 percent by assets—were well capitalized. 
With banks' financial condition still quite sound, they 
remain well positioned to meet future increases in the 
demand for credit. 
Percent of all U.S. commercial bank assets 
at well-capitalized banks 
[graph of Percent of all U.S. commercial bank assets at well- capitalized banks from 1990 through 2001.  In 1990 it was about 30%. Early 1992 it is about 35% then  moves up sharply, hitting about 97% in 1994. It stays up there,  just below 100, for the rest of the graph.] 
Note. The data are quarterly and extend through 2001: Q1. Capital status is 
determined using the regulatory standards for the leverage, tier 1, and total 
capital ratios. 
M2 growth rate 
[bar graph of M2 growth rate from 1990 thorough the  first half of 2001.  In 1990 it was about 4.2%. In 1991 it was about 3%.  In 1992 it was about 2%. In 1993 it was about 1.2%.  In 1994 it was about .6%. In 1995 it was about 4%.  In 1996 it was about 4.6%. In 1997 it was about 5.4%.  In 1998 it was about 8.6%. In 1999 it was about 6.4%.  In 2000 it was about 6.2%. In the first half of 2001 it  was about 10.2%.] 
NOTE. M2 consists of currency, travelers checks, demand deposits, other 
checkable deposits, savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts), 
small-denomination time deposits, and balances in retail money market funds. 
See footnote under the domestic nonfinancial debt chart for details on the com-
putation of growth rates. 
The Monetary Aggregates. 
The monetary aggregates have expanded rapidly so 
far this year, although growth rates have moderated 
somewhat recently. M2 rose 10 1/4 percent at an annual 
rate in the first half of this year after having grown 
6 1/4 percent in 2000. The interest rates on many of the 
components of M2 do not adjust quickly or fully to changes in market interest rates. As a consequence, 
the steep declines in short-term market rates this year 
have left investments in M2 assets relatively more 
attractive, contributing importantly to the accelera-
tion in the aggregate. M2 has also probably been 
buoyed by the volatility in the stock market this year, 
and perhaps by lower expected returns on equity 
investments, leading investors to seek the safety and 
liquidity of M2 assets. 
M3, the broadest monetary aggregate, rose at a 
13 1/4 percent annual rate through June, following 
9 1/4 percent growth in 2000. All of the increase in 
M3, apart from that accounted for by M2, resulted 
from a ballooning of institutional money market 
funds, which expanded by nearly a third. Yields on 
these funds lag market yields somewhat, and so the 
returns to the funds, like those on many M2 assets, 
became relatively attractive as interest rates on short-
term market instruments declined. 
M3 growth rate 
[bar graph of M3 growth rate from 1990 through the first  half of 2001.  In 1990 it was about 2.2%. In 1991 it was about 1%.  In 1992 it was about .5%. In 1993 it was about .8%.  In 1994 it was about 1.4%. In 1995 it was about 6.2%.  In 1996 it was about 7%. In 1997 it was about 8.8%.  In 1998 it was about 11%. In 1999 it was about 7.4%.  In 2000 it was about 9%. In the first half of 2001 it was  about 13%.] 
NOTE. M3 consists of M2 plus large-denomination time deposits, balances 
in institutional money market funds, RP liabilities (overnight and term), and 
eurodollars (overnight and term). See footnote under the domestic nonfinancial 
debt chart for details on the computation of growth rates. 
International Developments. 
So far this year, average foreign growth has weak-
ened further and is well below its pace of a year ago. 
Activity abroad was restrained by the continued high 
level of oil prices, the global slump of the high-
technology sector, and spillover effects from the U.S. 
economic slowdown, but in some countries domestic 
demand softened as well in reaction to local factors. 
High oil prices kept headline inflation rates some-
what elevated, but even though core rates of inflation 
have edged up in countries where economic slack has 
diminished, inflationary pressures appear to be well 
under control. 
Foreign interest rates 
[two graphs, one of short-term (three month) rates, the other of  long-term (ten-year government bonds) rate, from Q1 of 2000 through  the beginning of Q3 of 2001.]  [graph one (short term)  : plots four lines: U.K. interbank, Canadian finance paper,  Euro-area interbank, and Japanese CD. The Japanese CD stays at about  0% the whole graph, except for rising up to about .2% the middle of  the third quarter of 2000 through the first quarter of 2001 then going  back down to about 0%.  In the beginning of Q1, U.K. Interbank is about 6%, Canadian finance  paper about 5.1%, Euro-area interbank about 3.4%. The middle of Q2  of 2000, U.K. and Canadian were about 6%, euro-area was about 4.6%.  In the middle of Q4 of 2000, U.K. and Canadian were about 6%,  euro-area about 5.2%. In the beginning of Q3 of 2001, U.K. is about  5.2%, Canadian and Euro-area are about 4.4%.] 
[graph 2 (long-term foreign interest rates): plots four lines:  Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan.  They start 2000 with Canada at about 6.3%, UK at about 7.7%,  Germany at about 7.5%, Japan at about 1.6%. They all have a  slow downward tendency until about the end of Q1 of 2001.  Canada reaches about 5%, UK and Germany about 4.5%,  Japan about 1%. They reach Q3 of 2001 with Canada at about  5.9%, UK and Germany at about 5%, Japan at about 1.25%.] 
NOTE. The data are weekly and extend through July 11, 2001. 
Monetary authorities in most cases reacted to signs 
of slowdown by lowering official rates, but by less 
than in the United States. Partly in response to these 
actions, yield curves have steepened noticeably so far 
in 2001. Although long-term interest rates moved 
down during the first quarter, they more than reversed 
those declines in most cases as markets reacted to 
a combination of the anticipation of stronger real 
growth and the risk of increased inflationary pressure. 
Foreign equity markets—especially for high-tech 
stocks—were buffeted early this year by many of the 
same factors that affected U.S. share prices: negative 
earnings reports, weaker economic activity, buildups 
of inventories of high-tech goods, and uncertainties 
regarding the timing and extent of policy responses. 
In recent months, the major foreign equity indexes 
moved up along with U.S. stock prices, but they have 
edged off lately and in most cases are down, on 
balance, for the year so far. 
Slower U.S. growth, monetary easing by the Fed-
eral Reserve, fluctuations in U.S. stock prices, and the 
large U.S. external deficit have not undermined dollar 
strength. After the December 2000 FOMC meeting, 
the dollar lost ground against the major currencies; 
but shortly after the FOMC's surprise rate cut on January 3, the dollar reversed all of that decline as 
market participants evidently reassessed the pros-
pects for recovery in the United States versus that 
in our major trading partners. The dollar as measured 
by a trade-weighted index against the currencies of 
major industrial countries gained in value steadily in 
the first three months of 2001, reaching a fifteen-year 
high in late March. Continued flows of foreign funds 
into U.S. assets appeared to be contributing impor-
tantly to the dollar's increase. Market reaction to 
indications that the U.S. economy might be headed 
toward a more prolonged slowdown undercut the 
dollar's strength somewhat in early April, and the 
dollar eased further after the unexpected April 18 rate 
cut by the FOMC. However, the dollar has more than 
made up that loss in recent months as signs of weak-
ness abroad have emerged more clearly. On balance, 
the dollar is up about 7 percent against the major 
currencies so far this year; against a broader index 
that includes currencies of other important trading 
partners, the dollar has appreciated 5 percent. 
Nominal U.S. dollar exchange rates 
[Two graphs: Exchange rate indexes and Selected bilateral rates, from  Q1 of 2000 through the beginning of Q3 of 2001.]  [graph 1 (exchange rate indexes):  plotting two lines: Major currencies and broad. 2001 starts  off with both at 100. The middle of Q2 2000 Major currencies was  up to about 107.5, Broad to about 104.5. At the end of Q2 2000 they  were down, Major currencies about 104 and Broad about 102.5.  Up again until about the middle of Q4 2000, when Major currencies  hits about 112.5, broad about 108. Then they go down until the  beginning of 2001, when Major currencies hits about 107.5, broad  about 106. At the beginning of Q2 2001, Major currencies are up to  about 115, Broad to about 111. Middle of Q2 Major currencies is  down to about 113, Broad to about 109. They reach the beginning of  Q3 2001 with Major currencies at about 115, broad at about 111.5.] 
[graph 2 (selected bilateral rates): plotting four lines: Canadian dollar,  UK pound, Euro, and Japanese yen, from Q1 2000 through the  beginning of Q3 2001.  They all start out 2000 at 100. The Euro and pound drop to 98.5 the  first quarter of Q1 2000, but after that everything stays above 100.  At the middle of Q2 2000, Euro is about 113, UK Pound about 110,  Japanese yen about 106, Canadian dollar about 104. They drop for the  beginning of Q3 2000: Euro and pound at about 107, yen and dollar at  about 102.5. In Q4 2000 they are up: Euro at about 122, pound about  115.5, yen and dollar at about 107.5. In the beginning of Q1 2001  euro, yen, and pound cross at about 110, canadian dollar is at about103.  The beginning of Q2 2001, Euro and pound are about 114, yen is about  122.5, and dollar is about 109. In the beginning of Q3 2001, Euro is  about 120, en is about 122.5, pound is about 115.5, and dollar is about  105.] 
NOTE. The data are weekly and extend through July 11, 2001. Indexes (top 
panel) are trade-weighted averages of the exchange value of the dollar against 
major currencies and against the currencies of a broad group of important U.S. 
trading partners. Bilateral rates (bottom panel) are in foreign currency units per 
dollar. 
The dollar has gained about 9 percent against 
the yen, on balance, as the Japanese economy has 
remained troubled by structural problems, stagnant 
growth, and continuing deflation. Industrial produc-
tion has been falling, and real GDP declined slightly 
in the first quarter, with both private consumption and 
investment contracting. Japanese exports also have 
sagged because of slower demand from many key 
trading partners. Early in the year, under increasing 
pressure to respond to signs that their economy was 
weakening further, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) slightly 
reduced the uncollateralized overnight call rate, its 
key policy interest rate. By March, the low level of 
equity prices, which had been declining since early 
2000, was provoking renewed concerns about the 
solvency of Japanese banks. In mid-March, the BOJ 
announced that it was shifting from aiming at a 
particular overnight rate to targeting balances that 
private financial institutions hold at the Bank, effec-
tively returning the overnight rate to zero; the BOJ 
also announced that it would continue this easy 
monetary stance until inflation moves up to zero or 
above. After the yen had moved near the end of 
March to its weakest level relative to the dollar in 
more than four years, Japanese financial markets 
were buoyed by the surprise election in May of 
Junichiro Koizumi to party leadership and thereby to 
prime minister. The yen firmed slightly for several 
weeks thereafter, but continued weak economic fun-
damentals and increased market focus on the daunt-
ing challenges facing the new government helped 
push the yen back down and beyond its previous low 
level. 
At the start of 2001, economic activity in the euro 
area had slowed noticeably from the more rapid rates 
seen early last year but still was fairly robust. Aver-
age GDP growth of near 2 percent was only slightly 
below estimated rates of potential growth, although 
some key countries (notably Germany) were showing 
signs of faltering further. Although high prices for oil 
and food had raised headline inflation, the rate of 
change of core prices was below the 2 percent ceiling 
for overall inflation set by the European Central Bank 
(ECB). The euro also was showing some signs of 
strength, having moved well off the low it had 
reached in October. However, negative spillovers 
from the global slowdown started to become more 
evident in weaker export performance in the first 
quarter, and leading indicators such as business confi-
dence slumped. Nevertheless, the ECB held policy 
steady through April, as further weakening of the 
euro against the dollar (following a trend seen since 
the FOMC' s rate cut in early January), growth of M3 
in excess of the ECB's reference rate, and signs of an edging up of euro-area core inflation were seen as 
militating against an easing of policy. 
In early May, the ECB surprised markets with a 
25 basis point reduction of its minimum bid rate 
and parallel reductions of its marginal lending and 
deposit rates. In explaining the step, the ECB noted 
that monetary developments no longer posed a threat 
to price stability and projected that moderation of 
GDP growth would damp upward price pressure. The 
euro has continued to fall since then and, on balance, 
has declined 9 percent against the dollar since the 
beginning of the year. Faced with a similar slowdown 
in the U.K. economy that was exacerbated by the 
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, the Bank of 
England also cut its official call rate three times (by a 
total of 75 basis points) during the first half of the 
year. The Labor Party's victory in parliamentary elec-
tions in early June seemed to raise market expecta-
tions of an early U.K. euro referendum and put addi-
tional downward pressure on sterling, but that was 
partly offset by signs of stronger inflationary pres-
sure. On balance, the pound has lost about 6 percent 
against the dollar this year, while it has strengthened 
against the euro. 
The exchange value of the Canadian dollar has 
swung over a wide range in 2001. In the first quarter, 
the Canadian dollar fell about 5 percent against 
the U.S. dollar as the Canadian economy showed 
signs of continuing a deceleration of growth that had 
started in late 2000. Exports—especially autos, auto 
equipment, and electronic equipment—suffered from 
weaker U.S. demand. Softer global prices for non-
oil commodities also appeared to put downward pres-
sure on the Canadian currency. With inflation well 
within its target range, the Bank of Canada cut its 
policy rate several times by a total of 125 basis 
points. So far this year, industries outside of manufac-
turing and primary resources appear to have been 
much less affected by external shocks, and domestic 
demand has maintained a fairly healthy pace. Since 
the end of March, the Canadian dollar has regained 
much of the ground it had lost earlier and is down 
about 2 percent on balance since the beginning of the 
year. 
Global financial markets were rattled in February 
by serious problems in the Turkish banking sector. 
Turkish interest rates soared and, after market pres-
sures led authorities to allow the Turkish lira to float, 
it experienced a sharp depreciation of more than 
30 percent. An IMF program announced in mid-May 
that will bring $8 billion in support this year and 
require a number of banking and other reforms helped 
steady the situation temporarily, but market sentiment 
started to deteriorate again in early July. 
Emerging markets 
[two graphs: daily exchange rates and bond spreads, from Q1 2000  through the beginning of Q3 2001.]  [graph 1 (daily exchange rates): plots four lines: Argentina, Mexico,  Korea, and Brazil. Argentina stays at about 100 the whole graph.  All the lines start off 2000 at 100. Korea, Brazil, and Mexico move down,  and in the beginning of Q2 2000, Brazil is at about 95, Mexico about 97,  Korea about 98. In the beginning of Q3 2000, Korea and Brazil are  about 98, Mexico about 106. The middle of Q3 they are all at about 98.  Middle of Q4 2000, Korea and Mexico are about 100 and Brazil is about  108. Beginning of Q1 2001, Mexico is about 105, Brazil about 107, and  Korea about 113. Beginning of Q2 2001, Mexico is about 100, and Korea  and Brazil are about 119.5. Beginning of Q3 2001, Mexico is about 97,  Korea about 115, and Brazil about 137.] 
[graph 2 (bond spreads): plots four lines: Brazil, Argentina, Mexico,  and Korea. They start off 2000 with Brazil at about 6.5 percentage points,  Argentina at about 5.5 percentage points, Mexico at about 3.75 percentage  points, and Korea at about 1.5 percentage points. In the middle of Q2 2000,  Brazil is about 8.5, Argentina about 7.5, Mexico about 4.5, and Korea  about 2. At the end of Q3 2000, Brazil and Argentina are about 6.5,  Mexico about 3.5, and Korea about 2. The middle of Q4 2000, Argentina  is about 9, Brazil about 7.8, Mexico about 4, and Korea about 2.5.  The middle of Q1 2001, Brazil and Argentina are about 7, Mexico about 4,  Korea about 2. In The middle of Q2 2001, Argentina is about 11.5, Brazil  about 8.5, Mexico about 3.8, Korea about 2. end of Q2 2001, Argentina is  about 9, Brazil about 8, Mexico about 3.25, and Korea about 1.5. The  beginning of Q3 2001, Argentina is aobut 11.5, Brazil about 9, Mexico  about 3.5, and Korea about 2.] 
NOTE. The data are weekly and extend through July 11, 2001. Exchange rates 
(top panel) are in foreign currency units per dollar. Bond spreads (bottom panel) 
are the J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index ''plus'' (sovereign yield) 
spreads over U.S. Treasuries. 
In Argentina, the weak economy and the govern-
ment's large and growing debt burden stoked market 
fears that the government would default on its debt 
and alter its one-for-one peg of the peso to the dollar. 
In April, spreads on Argentina's internationally 
traded bonds moved up sharply, and interest rates 
spiked. In June, the government completed a nearly 
$30 billion debt exchange with its major domestic 
and international creditors aimed at alleviating the 
government's cash flow squeeze, improving its debt 
amortization profile, and giving it time to enact fiscal 
reforms and revive the economy. Argentine financial 
conditions improved somewhat following agreement 
on the debt swap. However, this improvement proved 
temporary, and an apparent intensification of market 
concerns about the possibility of a debt default trig-
gered a sharp fall in Argentine financial asset prices 
at mid-July. This financial turbulence in Argentina 
negatively affected financial markets in several other 
emerging market economies. The turmoil in Argen-
tina took a particular toll on Brazil, where an energy 
crisis added to other problems that have kept growth very slow since late last year. Intervention purchases 
of the real by the Brazilian central bank and a 
300 basis point increase in its main policy interest 
rate helped take some pressure off the currency, but 
the real has declined about 24 percent so far this year. 
The weak performance of the Mexican economy at 
the end of last year caused largely by a fall in exports 
to the United States (notably including a sharp drop 
in exports of automotive products) and tight mone-
tary policy carried over into early 2001. With infla-
tion declining, the Bank of Mexico loosened mone-
tary policy in May for the first time in three years. 
Problems with Mexican growth did not spill over to 
financial markets, however. The peso has remained 
strong and is up about 3 percent so far this year, and 
stock prices have risen. 
Average growth in emerging Asia slowed signifi-
cantly in the first half; GDP grew more slowly or 
even declined in economies that were more exposed 
to the effects of the global drop in demand for high-
tech products. Average growth of industrial produc-
tion in Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, for 
example, fell from a 15 percent annual rate in late 
2000 to close to zero in mid-2001. The turnaround of 
the high-tech component of industrial production in 
those countries was even more abrupt—from more 
than a 30 percent rate of increase to a slight decline 
by midyear. In the Philippines and Indonesia, eco-
nomic difficulties were compounded by serious politi-
cal tensions. Currencies in many of these countries 
moved down versus the dollar, and stock prices 
declined. In Korea, the sharp slump in activity that 
began late last year continued into 2001, as weakness 
in the external sector spread to domestic consumption 
and investment. The Bank of Korea lowered its target 
interest rate a total of 50 basis points over the first 
half of the year in response to the weakening in 
activity. The Chinese economy, which is less depen-
dent on technology exports than many other coun-
tries in the region, continued to expand at a brisk 
pace in the first half of this year, as somewhat softer 
export demand was offset by increased government 
spending. 